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Assessing the Cost of Regulatory Protections: 
 
Evidence on the Decision to Sell Securities Outside the United States 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the factors that affect the decision of U.S. companies to issue securities off-
shore compared with inside the United States.  Utilizing a data set of 1,444 domestic private 
placements and offshore offerings from 1993 to 1997, the paper reports that firms that experi-
enced a private securities fraud lawsuit in the past resort to foreign sources of capital more fre-
quently.  Similarly, companies in standard industrial classification groups that are targeted more 
often with private securities fraud litigation are also more likely to issue securities offshore than 
to conduct domestic private placements.  Not all issuers, however, choose to exit the U.S. re-
gime.  The paper employs past experience with a SEC investigation as a proxy for the amount of 
risk that the issuer may pose to investors.  Issuers with private securities fraud litigation experi-
ence that also encountered a past SEC investigation are more likely to raise capital through a 
domestic offering, consistent with the hypothesis that some issuers choose to raise capital in the 
United States when the bonding and signaling value of the U.S. legal liability regime outweighs 
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 The U.S. securities regulatory regime imposes a variety of information disclosure and 
antifraud mandatory requirements on issuers.  Two competing views exist on the benefits of the 
mandatory regime.  Under the first view, the mandatory application of the U.S. securities laws 
provides net positive benefits to investors (the “mandatory regulation hypothesis”).1  Without 
mandatory regulation, opportunistic issuers may employ a lower level of regulatory protections 
in an effort to extract value from new investors in the company.  Similarly, self-interested man-
agers may seek to adopt a lower level of protections to facilitate the appropriation of value from 
shareholders.  In contrast, under the second view, issuers may have sufficient incentives to adopt 
voluntarily regulatory protections that benefit investors (the “voluntary regulation hypothesis”), 
rendering mandatory regulation unnecessary.2  Rational investors will adjust the price they are 
willing to pay for the issuer’s securities based on the value of adopted investor protections.  Issu-
ers that voluntarily choose a higher valued protection, therefore, receive a greater price for their 
issued securities.  Other issuers may find the U.S. regime not worthwhile and choose to exit to 
other more value-maximizing regimes.  Through a comparison of U.S. issuers that raised capital 
offshore with U.S. issuers that raised capital within the United States, the paper provides a test of 
the mandatory and voluntary regulation hypotheses. 
 A U.S. issuer may choose from a variety of means to raise capital through the securities 
markets.  The paper focuses on choices that may affect the availability of Rule 10b-5 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) antifraud liability and exposure to possible Secu-
                                                        
1 See, e.g., Merritt Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor 
Empowerment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335 (1999).   
2 See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Se-
curities Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903 (1998).  For others that make a similar point for competition among secu-
rities regulatory regimes in the context of domestic state law see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L. J. 2359 (1998).  The motivation behind portable reciprocity finds its 
roots in the state corporate law race-to-the-top versus race-to-the-bottom debate.  For a discussion of the race-to-the-
bottom hypothesis see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1437 (1992); see also William L.  Cary, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974) (contending that state corporate law 
competition results in a race to the bottom).  For a discussion of the race-to-the-top argument see Daniel Fischel, 
The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 913, 919-20 (1982); see also Ralph K.  Winter,  Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of 
the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 258 (1977) (making the argument that state corporate law competition results 
in a race to the top). 
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rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions.3  Although other antifraud provi-
sions exist, the presence of Rule 10b-5 liability in almost all types of securities transactions ex-
poses issuers to the possibility of both private fraud litigation as well as SEC enforcement ac-
tions.  Even without mandatory disclosure, for example, many private placement issuers con-
struct public offering-style memorandum under the shadow of possible Rule 10b-5 liability.4  To 
test the incentive of issuers to avoid Rule 10b-5 liability, the paper focuses on one area under the 
securities laws where issuers are able to reduce, although not eliminate, exposure to Rule 10b-5: 
offshore offerings.5 
Against offshore offerings, the paper compares domestic private placements.  Domestic 
private placements represent the next closest alternative to raise capital while still facing Rule 
10b-5 private liability in addition to possible SEC enforcement actions.  Nevertheless, some is-
suers may face a choice only between a registered U.S. public offering and an offshore offering.  
Issuers that seek to sell a large dollar amount of securities to a great number of individual inves-
tors may choose only between a registered U.S. public offering and an offshore offering.  U.S. 
public offerings represent a greater level of mandatory information disclosure and antifraud li-
ability. The comparison between only offshore and private placement offerings may therefore 
understate the incentive of U.S. issuers to avoid the U.S. regime and bias the paper’s results to-
                                                        
3 Rule 10b-5 provides liability for materially misleading statements and omissions where necessary to make 
any statements made not misleading in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, among other requirements.  
Rule 10b-5 states that:  
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange, 
(1) to employ any device scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would op-
erate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
 
Rule 10b-5, Exchange Act.   
4 See William Carney, Issuer Choice of Securities Regulation Regimes: Review and Comments (forthcom-
ing Virginia Journal of International Law, 2001). 
5 As discussed below, the reduction of exposure to Rule 10b-5 is not due directly to the operation of Regu-
lation S of the Securities Act.  Rather, case law driven limitations on subject matter jurisdiction, choice of law provi-
sions, and the difficulties of maintaining a class action involving foreign plaintiff-investors lower the likelihood of a 
Rule 10b-5 action stemming from an offshore offering. 
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ward finding no significant difference for issuers offering securities abroad.  As discussed below, 
nevertheless, offshore offerings are closely matched with domestic private placements in terms 
of offering amount size as well as the total assets and market capitalization of the issuers.   
The paper’s data set consists of 1,444 offshore offerings and domestic private placements 
of equity securities and securities convertible into equity by Exchange Act reporting companies 
from 1993 to 1997.6  Utilizing the data set, the paper uses two proxies for the importance of anti-
fraud liability in an issuer’s decision on where to raise capital.  First, the paper reports that an 
issuer’s past experience with private securities fraud litigation in the United States correlates 
with the decision to sell securities abroad.  Issuers with private fraud action litigation experience 
may face a heightened probability of facing a subsequent action (Romano, 1991).  Second, firms 
in standard industrial classification (SIC) groups that are targeted more frequently with securities 
fraud lawsuits are significantly more likely to issue securities offshore rather than to pursue a 
domestic private placement.  Firms in SIC groups where plaintiffs’ attorneys have made the sunk 
cost investment to learn about the industry may face an increased risk of private fraud litigation. 
 Despite evidence that avoidance of antifraud liability may factor into the decision of 
companies to raise capital abroad, the question remains whether choice in regulation is beneficial 
or harmful to investors.  In particular, the paper tests whether companies seek to offer securities 
abroad to defraud foreign investors.  U.S. issuers, as well, may employ foreign investors as con-
duits to sell overvalued securities into the United States, thereby harming U.S. investors.7  In 
contrast, more benign motivations may drive U.S. issuers to sell securities abroad.  U.S. issuers, 
for instance, may seek to sell abroad due to the cost of potential non-meritorious securities litiga-
tion associated with offerings in the United States.  Alexander (1991) and Bohn and Choi (1996) 
provide evidence of frivolous securities litigation targeting issuers of initial public offerings.  
Even where suits are not frivolous, the cost of imposing liability may outweigh the benefits from 
deterring fraud.  Arlen and Kraakman (1997), for example, contend that imposing strict liability 
on a firm for the actions of its managers may reduce the incentives of the firm to police for viola-
                                                        
6 The periodic filings include annual Form 10-K, quarterly Form 10-Q, and occasional Form 8-K.  See Sec-
tion 13(a), Exchange Act; Regulation 13A (providing rules on periodic disclosure requirements of Exchange Act 
registered companies), Exchange Act; Forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, Exchange Act. 
7 See Choi (2000). 
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tions compared with a more negligence duty-based regime.  The choice of an offshore offering 
over a domestic private placement, therefore, may increase the welfare of the issuer and investors 
by eliminating unnecessarily costly U.S. regulations consistent with the voluntary regulation hy-
pothesis.  Other issuers, in contrast, may actively seek to expose themselves to the U.S. antifraud 
regime to increase the credibility of their offering to investors, thereby obtaining a higher securi-
ties offering price, also consistent with the voluntary regulation hypothesis. 
To determine whether the choice to reduce U.S. regulatory protections is beneficial to in-
vestors, the paper focuses on those issuers in the data sample that experienced a private securities 
fraud suit prior to the offering.8   As one proxy of the risk that such issuers pose investors, the 
paper gathered data on the past SEC investigation history of the issuers.  For each issuer that ex-
perienced pre-offering fraud litigation, SEC filings on Westlaw and Lexis and reports on PR-
Newswire are searched from 10 years prior to the offering up to the start of the offering to de-
termine whether the SEC initiated a fraud-related informal or formal investigation or enforce-
ment-related action (collectively referred to as “SEC investigations”).9  To the extent the SEC 
brings only meritorious actions, issuers with a prior SEC investigation pose a higher risk to in-
vestors.  Of the 86 offshore offerings conducted by an issuer with pre-offering private fraud liti-
gation experience, 16.3% also involved an issuer that faced a SEC investigation prior to the of-
fering.  In comparison, of the 81 domestic private placements that involved an issuer with pre-
offering private fraud litigation, 35.8% also had an issuer with prior SEC investigation experi-
ence (difference significant at the 1% level).  To the extent a prior SEC investigation correlates 
with an increased risk of a fraudulent offering, offshore offerings posed a reduced risk of fraud 
compared with domestic private placements. 
Similarly, plaintiffs fared worse on the merits against offshore offering issuers in pre-
offering private fraud litigation than plaintiffs in litigation targeting domestic private placement 
issuers. Of the offshore offering issuers with private fraud litigation experience, 25.8% obtained 
a dismissal or pro-defendant judgment.  In comparison, of the domestic private placements in-
                                                        
8 Issuers with pre-offering fraud action experience are defined as those issuers that faced a private securities 
fraud-related action anywhere from 10 years prior to the offering up to the start of the offering. 
9 Both SEC investigations related to and unrelated to the prior private securities litigation are tracked as a 
signal to investors that the issuer may pose a heightened risk of fraud. 
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volving an issuer with private fraud litigation experience, only 12.3% obtained a dismissal or 
pro-defendant judgment in its favor (difference significant at the 10% level).  Evidence therefore 
exists that offshore offerings may provide a means for issuers that find U.S. antifraud liability to 
be non-value-maximizing to avoid such liability while still raising capital.  Similarly, evidence 
exists that issuers presenting a heightened risk of fraud for investors benefit from exposure to the 
U.S. regime as a means of bonding the truthfulness of their disclosures and signaling their value 
to investors.  The paper’s evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that issuers sort themselves 
according to the regime that best maximizes the value of their offering to investors. 
The paper also examines the discount at which offshore offerings and domestic private 
placements of common stock are sold to investors relative to the secondary market price at the 
start of the offering.  To the extent issuers use the U.S. regime to bond the issuers’ credibility, 
offshore offerings should receive a greater discount compared with domestic private placements.  
The paper presents evidence that the mean offering discount from the secondary market price at 
the start date of the offering is 29.4% for the paper’s sample of common stock offshore offerings 
and 17.4% for domestic private placements of common stock.  Several disparate factors, never-
theless, may affect the discount.  Investors, for example, may possess more information on issu-
ers with a large market capitalization and a correspondingly large analyst following. To control 
for such differences, the paper estimates an ordinary least square model of the offering discount 
for solely the offshore offerings.  Predicted offshore discounts are then obtained using the model 
for the domestic private placement offerings to determine the discount that the offerings would 
have received had they been conducted offshore.  The mean predicted offshore discount is 6.3 
percentage points greater than the actual discount for the domestic private placements.  For do-
mestic private placement issuers with both prior private fraud litigation and SEC investigation 
experience, the mean predicted offshore discount is 21.2 percentage points greater than the actual 
discount.   
Section 1 provides a summary of the relevant securities laws pertaining to offshore offer-
ings and domestic private placements.  Section 2 offers a description of the paper's data set.  Sec-
tion 3 examines the factors that determine whether a U.S. issuer chooses to sell securities abroad 
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or through a domestic private placement.   Section 4 analyzes whether issuers that avoid U.S. 
securities regulation through an offshore offering do so as a means to increase investor welfare 
by reducing exposure to non-value maximizing aspects of the U.S. securities regime or, in the 
alternative, to engage in fraud to the detriment of investor welfare.   
 
1.  Regulation of Non-Public Offerings 
The U.S. securities regulatory regime seeks to protect investors and to safeguard the in-
tegrity of capital markets through mandatory information disclosure and antifraud liability, 
among other measures.  Issuers seeking to raise capital through a public offering in the United 
States must comply with complex rules that both restrict the amount of information issuers may 
disclose prior to the offering and require the mandatory disclosure of information in a formal 
registration statement filed with the SEC and distributed in part to investors.10  Issuers and other 
parties connected with the offering also face heightened antifraud liability under Sections 11 and 
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act).11  Issuers, in turn, may avoid many of the 
securities regulations governing public offerings through either an offshore offering or a domes-
tic private placement (collectively referred to as “non-public offerings”). 
Offshore offerings avoid the public offering registration requirements through the opera-
tion of Regulation S of the Securities Act.12  Regulation S represents a policy choice to respect 
territorial boundaries:13 where securities transactions takes place within the United States, the 
                                                        
10 For instance, a public offering requires the filing of a registration statement with the SEC and the deliv-
ery of a prospectus to each offeree.  Section 5 of the Securities Act controls the public offering process.  See Section 
5, Securities Act.  See generally James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman, Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation: 
Cases and Materials 276 – 308 (2d. ed, 1997) (describing the public offering process under U.S. securities laws). 
11 See Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. 
12 Regulation S is contained in Rules 901 through 905 of the Securities Act.  See Rules 901-905, Securities 
Act. 
13 See SEC, Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6779, 1988 WL 239804, *9 (S. E. C.) 
[hereinafter, the 1988 Proposing Release] (“The Regulation proposed today is based on a territorial approach to sec-
tion 5 of the Securities Act.  Under such an approach, the registration of securities is intended to protect the U.S. 
capital markets and all investors purchasing in the U.S. market, whether U.S. or foreign nationals.”).   
The SEC adopted Regulation S in 1990.  See SEC, Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 
33-6863, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,534 (Apr. 24, 1990) [hereinafter the “Adopting 
Release”].  See also Guy P. Lander, Regulation S – Securities Offerings Outside the United States, 21 N.C. J. Int’l 
L. & Com. Reg. 339 (1996) (providing a summary of the original Regulation S). 
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U.S. securities regime applies.14  Conversely, where transactions occur wholly outside the United 
States then the securities regulatory regimes of other countries are assumed to apply and the of-
fering is exempt from the registration requirements under the Securities Act.  To ensure that only 
offerings outside the United States receive an exemption from the registration requirements of 
the Securities Act, Regulation S imposes a number of transaction-related restrictions.15 Issuers, 
for example, may not register any transfers of their securities unless made through a registered 
offering, an exemption from registration, or under the terms of Regulation S.16 Restrictions are 
also placed on the ability of foreign purchasers to resell into the United States.  For the time pe-
riod of the paper’s data set, foreign investors faced a 40-day restricted period during which re-
sales into the United States are prohibited.17 
In contrast, the requirements for a domestic private placement do not focus on territorial 
boundaries.  Instead, the availability of a private placement is contingent upon the investment 
sophistication of the purchasers and the dollar amount of the offering, among other factors.  Of-
ferings made to investors able to “fend for themselves” for example may receive an exemption 
under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act from the public registration requirements.18  Providing a 
safe harbor for Section 4(2), among other provisions, Regulation D of the Securities Act imposes 
bright-line limitations on the number and types of investors as well as the offering amount per-
missible in a private placement.19  Issuers seeking to engage in a private placement through the 
                                                        
14 Regulation S also prohibits U.S. issuers from engaging directed selling efforts within the United States.  
See Rule 902(c), Securities Act (defining “directed selling efforts”). 
15 The transactional restrictions under the current version of Regulation S for U.S. issuers of equity last for 
a one-year “distribution compliance period”.  See Rule 903(b)(3), Securities Act. 
16 See Rule 903(b)(3)(iii)(4), Securities Act.  Issuers are also required to place a legend on issued securities 
indicating that the securities were sold through Regulation S and are unregistered. See Rule 903(b)(3)(iii)(3), Securi-
ties Act. 
17 The current version of Regulation S makes it clear that securities purchased under Regulation S are 
considered “restricted”.  See Rule 905, Securities Act.   Initial investors of a Regulation S offering, in turn, may not 
resell restricted securities back into the United States without complying with either the public offering registration 
requirements of the Securities Act or an exemption from the registration requirements.  For example, Rule 144 of 
the Securities Act provides an exemption for investors that have held their securities for at least one year, among 
other requirements.  See Rule 144, Securities Act.   
 18 See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston-Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (holding that a non-public offering for pur-
poses of Section 4(2) of the Securities Act is "an offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for them-
selves").  See also  James D. Cox et al., Securities Regulation: Cases & Materials 378 – 90 (2d ed. 1997) (describing 
a Fifth Circuit line of cases expanding on Ralston Purina). 
19 Regulation D also implements private placements under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act.  See Section 
3(b), Securities Act. 
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safe harbor under Rule 506 of Regulation D, for example, may sell an unlimited amount of secu-
rities to any number of accredited investors and a maximum of 35 non-accredited purchasers, 
among other requirements.20  As with offshore offerings under Regulation S, purchasers in a pri-
vate placement bear restrictions on their ability to resell freely into the U.S. public secondary 
market.  During the time period of the data sample, most private placement investors faced a 2-
year holding period.21 
Significantly, for Exchange Act reporting companies, the relief provided through either 
an offshore offering or a domestic private placement is limited.  Regardless of whether a com-
pany engages in a securities offering, Exchange Act reporting companies must comply with peri-
odic filing requirements.22  Companies, for instance, must routinely disclose financial and busi-
ness-related information to the capital markets through Form 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filings with 
the SEC.  In addition, Rule 10b-5 antifraud liability applies to the information contained in such 
periodic filings, exposing the companies to the possibility of private civil litigation.23   
For the purposes of this paper’s empirical tests, nevertheless, it is important to note that 
Exchange Act reporting companies may relieve themselves of significant regulatory require-
ments through an offshore offering compared with a domestic private placement.  First, issuers 
that conduct a domestic private placement may need to provide certain limited information to 
purchasers of the offering.  For example, issuers that seek to offer and sell securities under the 
                                                        
20 See Rule 506(b)(2), Securities Act.  Rule 501(a), in turn, defines an accredited investor to include many 
institutional investors, top management of the issuer, and individual investors that meet minimum wealth and in-
come criteria.  See Rule 501(a), Securities Act.  The limit on the number of purchasers under Rule 506 of Regulation 
D does not apply to accredited investors.  See 501(e), Securities Act.  Private placement issuers therefore may sell to 
an unlimited number of accredited investors. 
21 In early 1997, the SEC promulgated new rules reducing the holding period under Rule 144 for resales of 
restricted securities to one year.  See SEC, Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145, Rel. 
Release No. 33-7390, 17 CFR Part 230 (Feb. 20, 1997). 
22 The Exchange Act imposes periodic information reporting requirements for certain issuers, commonly 
known as “Exchange Act reporting companies”.  Companies listed on a national securities exchange must register 
and comply with the SEC’s periodic information disclosure requirements.  See Section 13(a), Exchange Act; Section 
12(b), Exchange Act; see also Section 3(a)(1), Exchange Act (defining “exchange” for the purposes of the Exchange 
Act).  As well, companies whose total assets exceed $10 million and have a class of equity security (other than an 
exempted security) held of record by more than 500 shareholders must register the securities under the Exchange 
Act and thereby come under the periodic reporting requirements of Section 13(a).  See Section 13, Exchange Act; 
Section 12(g), Exchange Act; see also Rule 12g-1 (raising the asset requirement to $10 million). 
23 Rule 10b-5 itself does not explicitly provide for a private cause of action.  Nevertheless, courts have long 
interpreted Rule 10b-5 to provide private litigants the ability to obtain damages.  See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamples v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 753 – 55 (1975) (limiting the implied cause of action under Rule 10b-5 to actual 
purchasers or sellers of securities involved in the transaction in question). 
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Regulation D private placement safe harbor to non-accredited investors must provide informa-
tion pursuant to Rule 502(b) of the Securities Act, including updated financial statements and 
information related to the securities transaction.24  In comparison, issuers that offer securities 
through an offshore offering under Regulation S are not required to provide investors any infor-
mation under U.S. securities laws.  Instead, the securities laws of the jurisdiction in which the 
offshore offering takes place may impose varying information disclosure requirements. 
Second, issuers in domestic private placements and offshore offerings face differential 
exposure to antifraud liability.  Issuers that conduct a domestic private placement always face the 
possibility of Rule 10b-5 liability for materially misleading statements.  In contrast, federal 
courts within the United States apply varying standards for when to grant subject matter jurisdic-
tion for Rule 10b-5 violations that occur as part of an offering outside the United States.  Some 
courts, for example, focus on whether “conduct” related to the fraud occurred within the United 
States.25  Among such courts, the definition of conduct varies.  Several courts require only pre-
paratory conduct while others require significant conduct greater than merely preparatory.26  Yet 
other courts focus on whether the fraud in the offering has “effects” within the United States.27  
                                                        
24 See Rule 502(b), Securities Act.  Note that when securities are sold under Regulation D to only accred-
ited investors, Regulation D imposes no specific information disclosure requirements.  See Rule 502(b)(2), Securi-
ties Act.  As well, offerings pursuant to Rule 504 under Regulation D need not comply with the information disclo-
sure requirements of Rule 502(b).  See Rule 504(b), Securities Act.  Nevertheless, Exchange Act reporting compa-
nies are prohibited from relying on Rule 504 private placements.  See Rule 504(a)(1), Securities Act. 
25 For a discussion of the current extraterritorial reach of American antifraud securities liability, see 
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Laws, 17 Nw. J. of 
Int’l Law & Bus. 207, 215 - 219 (1996). 
26 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that “merely preparatory 
acts” are insufficient to establish jurisdiction and requiring that acts within the United States directly caused the 
losses to foreigners outside the United States); Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson, 824 F.2d 27, 33 – 34 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(interpreting the Second Circuit’s test to mean that jurisdiction will lie in American courts where the domestic con-
duct satisfies the requisite elements for liability under Section 10 of the Exchange Act or Rule 10b-5).  But see SEC 
v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (granting jurisdiction “where at least some activity designed to further a 
fraudulent scheme occurs within this country”), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977). 
27 The mere fact that United States securities markets may experience an indirect effect has not been held as 
sufficient to generate subject matter jurisdiction.  See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 989. 
In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), the Sec-
ond Circuit found subject matter jurisdiction over a derivative suit involving a Canadian corporation and Canadian 
and U.S. defendants (including some of the corporation’s directors).  The derivative suit alleged that the Canadian 
and U.S. defendants defrauded the corporation through the purchase of the corporation’s securities at a bargain 
price.  In finding subject matter jurisdiction, the Second Circuit emphasized the need to apply jurisdiction extraterri-
torially “in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American Exchanges” and 
“to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities.”  
Id.  Sales of heavily discount securities to insiders, for example, may harm all shareholders in the firm through dilu-
tion of the per share value. 
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Offerings made solely to foreign investors outside the United States where information disclosed 
to the foreign investors is not released into the U.S., for example, would present only a minimal 
amount of effects within the United States.28  Although somewhat uncertain, the application of 
the conduct and effects tests for offshore offering results in a reduced probability of a court ap-
plying subject matter jurisdiction for antifraud liability.  In addition, some courts have eschewed 
applying antifraud liability where the investors of an offshore offering can be shown to have 
clearly sought to avoid the U.S. securities laws through the offshore offering.29 
Even where subject matter jurisdiction exists, courts allow parties ex ante to provide con-
tractually for choice of law and forum-selection clauses that limit the application of U.S. anti-
fraud liability.  Lloyd’s of London, for example, was sued under U.S. securities laws by several 
of its “Names” based in the United States.  Lloyd’s of London’s contractual arrangement with its 
Names, however, provided for British choice of law and British forum-selection clauses.  Courts 
in several U.S. federal circuits have upheld Lloyd’s forum-selection and choice of law clauses.30   
Although the Lloyd’s of London line of cases involved a foreign company-defendant and U.S. 
investor-plaintiffs, the rationale of the decisions – focusing on the international nature of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Unlike the Schoenbaum case, sales of securities to solely foreign investors through Regulation S in situa-
tions where the foreign investors bear the economic risk of ownership and are defrauded present no direct harm to 
U.S. investors.  In fact, U.S. shareholders in the issuer are benefited from sales of overvalued securities to foreign 
investors.  For example, consider Ajax, a U.S. issuer with a fundamental value of $100 per share and 100,000 shares 
outstanding.  Assume that Ajax then defrauds foreign investors, selling 100,000 additional shares at an overvalued 
price of $200 per share.  Post-offering, Ajax’s shares will then have a fundamental value of $150 per share.  Al-
though foreign investors are harmed, U.S. shareholders are in fact benefited from the fraud. 
28 On the other hand, some courts have emphasized the U.S. identity of the issuer as an important factor in 
addition to the conduct and effects tests.  For example, in Int’l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d. Cir. 1980), 
Judge Friendly writing for the Second Circuit found subject matter jurisdiction for offshore transaction involving a 
wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of an American corporation.  In finding subject matter jurisdiction, Judge Friendly 
wrote,  “[w]e think Congress would have been considerably more interested in assuring against the fraudulent issu-
ance of securities constituting obligations of American rather than purely foreign businesses.” Id. at 920.  On the 
other hand, in Zoelsch, Judge Bork writing for the D.C. Circuit declined to find subject matter jurisdiction for an 
offshore offering that in substance raised funds for a U.S.-based investment partnership.  See Zoelsch,  824 F.2d 27, 
34. 
29 In MCG, Inc. v. Great Western Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1990), the court held that an Ameri-
can investor that sought to structure a transaction through a shell entity to appear “foreign” to satisfy the require-
ments for an offshore offering could not then seek to have Rule 10b-5 antifraud liability applied against the U.S.-
incorporated issuer.  See id. at 8 (“Having gone to such lengths to structure a transaction not burdened by the securi-
ties law, plaintiffs cannot expect to wrap themselves in their protective mantle when the deal sours.”). 
30 See generally Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 Colum. Bus. L. 
Rev. 1, 78 – 81 (describing the Lloyd’s of London cases). 
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choice of law and forum selection clauses – apply to transactions involving a U.S. issuer and for-
eign investors.31 
Private plaintiff attorneys within the United States may also choose systematically not to 
pursue a class action where a significant fraction of the class consists of foreign investors.32  
Courts, for example, may hesitate to certify a class action including foreign plaintiffs to the ex-
tent notice to the foreign plaintiffs is difficult.33  The possibility that foreign courts may not rec-
ognize the judgment of a U.S.-based court may lead U.S. courts to deny class certification with 
respect to foreign plaintiffs.34  Foreign investors also represent unique distributional issues for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys engaging in a class action; plaintiffs’ attorneys, for example, may have more 
difficulty locating, providing notice to, and distributing settlement awards to foreign investors.  
Outside of a class action, foreign investors individually pursuing a U.S. antifraud claim may also 
face higher transportation and language translation costs.   
The lower likelihood of private antifraud litigation from foreign-based investors com-
pared with U.S.-based investors, in turn, reduces the issuer’s exposure to antifraud litigation for 
two types of disclosure.  First, issuers engaged in confidential information disclosure to potential 
                                                        
31 The Lloyd’s of London cases cite The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 
L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), where the Supreme Court stated that courts should presumptively enforce choice of law and 
choice of forum clauses arising out of  "freely negotiated private international agreement[s]." Id. at 12-13, 92 S.Ct. 
at 1914.  The Supreme Court in Bremen reasoned that “[t]he elimination of all [ ] uncertainties [regarding the forum] 
by agreeing in advance ... is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and contracting." Id. at 13-
14, 92 S.Ct. at 1915.  Moreover, the Supreme Court in Bremen made clear that the party seeking to void a forum 
selection clause faces "a heavy burden of proof." Id. at 17, 92 S.Ct. at 1917. 
Applying Bremen, for example, in Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth 
Circuit stated that “[p]ublic policy weighs strongly in favor of Bremen, because uncertainty as to the forum for dis-
putes and applicable law ‘will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract touching two or more countries.’”  
Id. at 962 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 2455, 41 L.Ed.2d 270, 516 (1974)).  
Key to the presumption of enforceability, therefore, is not the precise identity of the issuer or investors but rather 
that their identities cut across international boundaries.   
32 In Kaufman v. Campeau Corporation, 744 F. Supp. 808 (S.D. Ohio 1991), the federal district court or-
dered that Canadian shareholders who bought their stock on Canadian exchanges be excluded from a class action 
involving U.S. investors against Campeau Corporation, a Canadian corporation with U.S. subsidiaries trading on the 
National Market System. 
33 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 – 98 & n.47 (2d Cir. 1975).  The Second Circuit 
in Bersch noted that “The management of a class action with many thousands of class members imposes tremendous 
burdens on overtaxed district courts, even when the class members are mostly in the United States and still more so 
when they are abroad.”  See id. at 996. 
34 See id. at 996 – 97. 
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investors in an offering may avoid Rule 10b-5 liability for the confidential disclosures.35  Sec-
ond, issuers may reduce their exposure to Rule 10b-5 liability for periodic disclosures distributed 
to the entire secondary market.  For example, an issuer that conducts a private placement for U.S. 
investors potentially exposes itself to antifraud liability not only to investors that engage in sec-
ondary market transactions in the issuer’s securities but also to the private placement investors 
for material misstatements and certain omissions in their recent Exchange Act reporting filings.  
The same issuer that conducts an offshore offering to foreign investors continues to face the risk 
of liability from U.S. investors engaging in secondary market transactions; higher costs of pursu-
ing litigation, however, may remove foreign investors in the issuer’s offering as possible plain-
tiffs for misleading statements in the issuer’s periodic disclosures.  Particularly for issuers that 
offer a large amount of securities relative to their average trading volume, an offshore offering 
may therefore offer significant relief from Rule 10b-5 liability. 
One final difference exists between domestic private placements and offshore offerings.  
Offerings that take place within the United States face the possibility of a SEC enforcement ac-
tion against either the issuer or various securities professionals that assist in the offering.  Off-
shore offerings, in contrast, face a much-mitigated risk of possible SEC enforcement to protect 
the interests of defrauded foreign investors.  The SEC’s market surveillance activities focus pri-
marily on U.S. markets, leading to a reduced probability of uncovering fraudulent activity over-
seas.  The SEC also faces greater information gathering costs when fraud occurs overseas, par-
ticularly in relation to foreign intermediaries that may assist in the offshore offering.  As with 
private antifraud actions, the SEC also must convince a court that it has subject matter jurisdic-
tion over fraud occurring abroad.  Finally, the SEC’s stated enforcement priorities during the 
1990s focused on the municipal bond market, mutual funds and investment advisors, the internet, 
insider trading, financial fraud, and securities offerings, among other areas.36  The SEC did not, 
however, make the protection of foreign investors purchasing in an offshore offering a stated 
                                                        
35 The SEC recently reduced the ability of issuers to engage in selective disclosures to prospective private 
placement investors.  See Securities and Exchange Commission, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Rel. No. 
34-43154, Aug. 15, 2000, 2000 WL 1239722 (S.E.C.).  
36 See William R. McLucas, Thomas C. Newkirk, Joan E. McKown, Alma M. Angotti, Nancy E. Allin, 
29th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation: Recent SEC Enforcement Cases, 1023 PLI/Corp 625. 
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priority.37  Issuers that seek to bond themselves using U.S. antifraud liability, therefore, may seek 
to issue inside the United States to expose themselves to a potential SEC enforcement action.   
To verify the claim that SEC enforcement is skewed toward policing harms that may di-
rectly affect U.S. investors through a private placement in comparison with harms affecting only 
foreign investors in an offshore offering, the paper tabulated the number of reported SEC en-
forcement-related actions involving antifraud liability and either a private placement or an off-
shore offering.  Data on reported enforcement activity is obtained from CCH’s Federal Securities 
Law Reporter for the time period from 1991 to 1999.  Among the reported SEC actions, 34 re-
lated to a domestic private placement and only 5 related to an offshore offering.  Moreover, 
among the 5 offshore offering-related actions, 1 also involved a domestic private placement and 
3 involved the immediate flowback of securities into the United States where the true economic 
risk of ownership remained with U.S. investors.  Only 1 of the offshore related actions involved 
foreign investors that obtained economic ownership of issued securities; moreover, the foreign 
investors were shell corporations formed as part of a scheme for insiders of the U.S. issuer to sell 
heavily discounted securities to offshore entities in which the insiders owned a controlling inter-
est.38  None of the offshore offering-related SEC enforcement actions directly related to the pro-
tection of foreign investors. 
Table 1 summarizes U.S. disclosure and antifraud liability differences for public offer-
ings, domestic private placements, and offshore offerings. 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here]. 
 
                                                        
37 In the mid-1990s, the SEC did focus on the flowback of securities sold abroad back into the United States 
in situations where the economic risk of ownership never left the United States.  See SEC, Problematic Practices 
Under Regulation S, Securities Act Release No. 33-7190, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 3059C (June 27, 1995) [here-
inafter, Problematic Practices Release] (describing a number of harms to U.S. investors from Regulation S offer-
ings).  Nevertheless, the SEC’s focus on offshore offerings was primarily to protect U.S. investors and not the initial 
foreign purchasers of the offshore offering. 
38 See In the Matter of Windswept Environmental Group, Inc., Release Nos. 33-7780; 34-42165; Adminis-
trative Proceeding File No. 3- 10107 (November 22, 1999). 
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2.  Sample Description and Summary Statistics 
 The data set consists of offshore offerings and domestic private placements conducted by 
Exchange Act reporting U.S. issuers from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997.  Offerings of 
four different types of equity and securities convertible into equity are tracked, including: (1) 
common stock, (2) non-convertible preferred stock, (3) convertible preferred stock, and (4) con-
vertible debt securities.   
Offshore offerings are identified through searches of SEC filings on Lexis and Westlaw 
as well as the SEC’s EDGAR database.39  Prior to November 1996, the SEC did not specifically 
require issuers to disclose their offshore offerings.  Issuers, as a result, disclosed information on 
offshore offerings in one of their SEC filings or financial statements only to the extent the offer-
ings were "material" to the understanding of some other required information disclosure item.40  
For example, some issuers disclosed information on their offshore offerings in their required dis-
cussion on capital resources under Item 303 of Regulation S-K.41  Then from November 1996 
until December 1998, the SEC required issuers to reveal all equity-related offshore offerings un-
der Item 9 of Form 8-K within 15 days of the offering.42  Offshore offerings prior to November 
1996 therefore comprise only a subset of the entire universe of offshore offerings.  This subset, 
moreover, may be biased toward offerings where the issuer believed that disclosure of the offer-
ing outweighed any negative effects from disclosure.  Nevertheless, due to the materiality re-
quirement for SEC filings, the search uncovered the majority of larger size offerings.   
Information on U.S. firms conducting a domestic private placement from January 1, 1993 
to December 31, 1997, in turn, was obtained from the Securities Data Company Private Place-
ment Database.  Searches on Lexis, Westlaw and the SEC's internet version of the EDGAR data-
base were conducted to identify additional domestic private placements of equity and securities 
                                                        
39 The SEC’s EDGAR database is located on the internet at http://www.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm. 
40 See Rule 408, Securities Act. 
41 Issuers may also voluntarily disclose their offshore offerings under Item 5 of Form 8-K to the extent the 
offering was "important".  See Item 5 of Form 8-K, Exchange Act. 
42 See Item 9 of Form 8-K, Exchange Act.  See SEC Release No. 34-37801 (1996).  Item 9 of Form 8-K re-
quires issuers of equity Regulation S securities to report the information mandated under Item 702 of Regulation S-
B, including the offering date, the amount of securities, the total offering price, and the principal underwriters 
among other information. 
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convertible into equity.  Offerings by issuers that also engaged in an offshore offering during the 
sample period were then eliminated, leaving 751 equity-related domestic private placements. 
Summary statistics of the offshore offerings and private placements by year and type of 
offered securities are presented in Panels A and B of Table 2.  
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
 Note that the majority of offerings are for common stock.  From Panel C of Table 2 also 
note that little difference exists in the propensity of a firm to engage in a domestic private place-
ment compared with an offshore offering for common stock offerings.  Nevertheless, a greater 
proportion of the convertible preferred offerings occur within the United States while a greater 
fraction of the convertible debt offerings occur offshore (test of the null hypothesis that the do-
mestic private placement and offshore offering distributions among different types of securities 
are identical: ÷2 = 98.141; prob. < 0.005).  
 Common stock offerings tend to be for a smaller offering amount, with a mean of $12.5 
million.  As Panel D of Table 2 reports, companies that trade on NASDAQ tend to engage in a 
greater proportion of the non-public offerings than those traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE).  On the other hand, issuers listed on the NYSE offer a much larger dollar 
amount of securities with an average offering amount of $140.4 million. 
The SIC code groups of the non-public offering issuers are also tracked.  Panel E of Ta-
ble 2 details the 2-digit SIC codes of the non-public offering issuers.  From Panel E of Table 2 
note that 12.33% of the offerings are clustered in SIC 28 (Chemicals and Allied Products) and 
11.61% are in SIC Code 73 (Business Services).  Also note that SIC codes 35 (Industrial and 
Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment) and 36 (Electrical Equipment and Compo-
nents) in combination account for 15.35% of the offerings.  The differences among the various 2-
digit SIC code groups are statistically significant at the 0.5% level  (÷2 = 3364.5; prob. < 0.005). 
 Panel F of Table 2 reports on the five 3-digit SIC codes with the greatest frequency of 
offerings.  Note that 153 offerings are made by issuers in SIC code 283 (Drugs) representing 
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11.0% of the non-public offerings.  In addition, the computer-related SIC codes 357 and 737 in 
combination account for 187 offerings, representing 13.5% of the non-public offerings. 
 
3.  Test of the Decision to Issue Securities Abroad 
This section tests the hypothesis that issuers choose to raise capital through an offshore 
offering at least in part to escape the U.S. regulatory regime.  Compared with a public offering of 
securities, private placements under U.S. securities law present issuers with less stringent disclo-
sure and antifraud requirements.  A domestic private placement therefore represents the next 
closest alternative to an offshore offering for an issuer to raise capital while still remaining 
within both the U.S. regime and the domestic capital markets.  The gain from exiting the U.S. 
regime to an issuer is therefore measured through a comparison of offshore offering issuers 
against issuers engaging in a domestic private placement.   
The comparison between offshore offerings and domestic private placements, neverthe-
less, may introduce bias into the paper’s test results.  Investors in domestic private placements, 
for example, typically are able to “fend for themselves”.  Where offshore foreign investors are 
systematically less sophisticated, the comparison may not correctly measure the impact of regu-
latory differences on the decision to issue securities abroad.  An issuer, for example, that seeks to 
sell to a broad range of unsophisticated investors faces a choice only between an offshore offer-
ing and U.S. public offering.  To the extent a U.S. public offering offers a greater level of regula-
tory protections, the comparison between only offshore and private placement offerings under-
states the incentive of U.S. issuers to avoid the U.S. regime and biases the paper’s results toward 
finding no significant difference for issuers offering securities abroad.   
In addition, the comparison between domestic private placements and offshore offerings 
may result in a biased assessment of the importance of fraud-related factors to the extent the ini-
tial decision to raise a specific amount of capital also depends on the same fraud-related factors.  
Nevertheless, the paper assumes that the decision to raise a particular dollar amount of capital is 
independent of the decision on the particular method used to raise the capital.  Modigliani and 
Miller (1959) provide one justification for this assumption.  To the extent firm value does not 
   
  
   18
depend on a firm’s capital structure, the need to raise capital will turn solely on the presence of 
investment projects within the firm that require funding and not on the different possible means 
of raising capital.   
Table 3 presents a comparison of characteristics of issuers engaged in offshore offerings 
and domestic private placements. 
 
 [Insert Table 3 Here]. 
 
Note from Panel A that the characteristics of the offshore offering and domestic private 
placements are comparable.  The mean offering amount for offshore offerings is $36.4 million 
and $29.2 million for domestic private placements (difference not statistically significant).43  
Likewise, the total asset size and market capitalization for both offshore offering and domestic 
private placement issuers are similar and indicate that mostly small capitalization companies en-
gage in such offerings.  The mean assets for offshore offering issuers is $577.4 million and 
$876.8 million for domestic private placements issuers (difference not statistically significant).  
The mean market capitalization (measured for the year prior to the offering) is $355.1 million for 
offshore offering issuers and $320.7 million for domestic private placement issuers (difference 
not statistically significant).  On the other hand, the median offering amount, market capitaliza-
tion, and assets for the offshore offering issuers are all lower than the median levels for the do-
mestic private placement issuers.  The difference in medians, as assessed using the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test, is significant at the 1% level for all three comparisons.  Figures 
1, 2, and 3 provide a graph of the offering amount, market capitalization, and asset size distribu-
tions of the domestic private placement and offshore offering issuers.  If anything, therefore, the 
summary statistics present evidence that offshore offerings are smaller in size than the domestic 
private placements.  To the extent more sophisticated investors tend to invest in smaller offerings 
(as compared with large public offerings), the summary statistics provide evidence against the 
                                                        
43 To the extent the data sample is comprehensive for the total population of domestic private placements 
and offshore offerings from 1993 to 1997, the t-test of the difference in sample means may not be appropriate.   
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possibility that public offerings, and not private placements, represent the next closest alternative 
to offshore offerings. 
On the other hand, the offshore offering issuers display significant corporate governance 
differences.  As tracked through SEC Disclosure and reported in Panel A of Table 3, offshore 
offering issuers have a greater fraction of corporate officers on their board (significant at the 5% 
level) and a lower fraction of their outstanding common stock in the hands of directors and offi-
cers (significant at the 5% level).44  Offshore offering issuers also have a lower fraction of their 
outstanding common stock in the hands of institutional investors as tracked by CDA/Spectrum 
(significant at the 5% level).  A greater fraction of offshore offerings are also made with registra-
tion rights for the investors; the difference with private placement offerings however is statisti-
cally insignificant. 
 To gauge the significance of the U.S. regulatory regime on the issuer’s choice between 
conducting an offshore or domestic private placement offering, the experience of each issuer as a 
defendant in private securities fraud litigation within the United States is tracked.  Prior history 
with a securities fraud lawsuit may translate into a higher probability of private litigation with 
respect to a subsequent offering.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys, for example, may have already expended 
resources learning about the company, reducing the marginal cost of pursuing a subsequent law-
suit.  A company that faced a prior meritorious action, as well, may contain structural factors – 
such as a management team willing to engage in fraud – that makes subsequent fraud more 
likely.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys may therefore monitor more closely the actions of a company that 
previously had a meritorious lawsuit filed against it.  Similarly, a company that settled a prior 
frivolous lawsuit may be perceived as an easy target among plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking to extort 
a settlement.  In a study of shareholder suits brought against a random sample of 535 public cor-
porations, Romano (1991) finds that past experience with shareholder litigation – particularly 
where the litigation results in a large settlement award – correlates significantly with an in-
                                                        
44 Share ownership is obtained from the reported “beneficial ownership” contained in the company’s SEC 
proxy filing.  Rule 13d-3 of the Exchange Act (17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3) defines a beneficial owner to include “any 
person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has 
or shares” voting power or investment power in a security.  A person who has the right to acquire beneficial owner-
ship of a security within sixty days through the exercise of any option or warrant is also considered a beneficial 
owner or the security. 
   
  
   20
creased probability of a subsequent shareholder suit.  To the extent issuers with experience as a 
defendant in a private securities fraud lawsuit expect a higher subsequent probability of litiga-
tion, they will view the U.S. securities regime as imposing a greater cost than compared with 
other issuers.   
The paper identifies private securities fraud litigation experience for each non-public of-
fering issuer through searches of Exchange Act reporting filings on Westlaw and Lexis and press 
releases through PR-Newswire.  In addition, data on private securities fraud lawsuits are ob-
tained from Stanford Law School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse.45  Prior fraud actions, 
involving securities offerings, periodic information disclosure, and acquisitions among others, 
are tracked from 10 years before the offering up to the start of the offering. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the private fraud litigation experience of the offshore offering 
and private placement issuers.  From Panel B, note that offshore offering issuers in the data sam-
ple had greater experience with securities fraud actions in the United States than did domestic 
private placement issuers.  Panel B of Table 3 reports that 86 offerings representing 12.5% of the 
total offshore offerings involved an issuer with pre-offering securities fraud litigation experience.  
In comparison, 81 private placements involved issuers with pre-offering fraud litigation experi-
ence, representing 10.8% of the total domestic private placements.  The difference, however, is 
statistically insignificant. 
To the extent fear of antifraud liability drives companies to issue securities offshore, one 
would expect this motivation to apply particularly to larger offering amounts.  Conducting an 
offering offshore involves higher fixed costs than an offering inside the United States.46  Where 
an issuer is engaged in only a small offering, the reduced exposure to antifraud liability may not 
exceed the fixed costs of engaging in an offshore offering.  Panel C of Table 3 reports the pre-
offering private fraud litigation experience of the non-public offerings categorized by the offer-
ing amount size quartile for the sample.47  Note that for the smallest offering amount quartile, 
                                                        
45 The Securities Class Action Clearinghouse is located on the internet at http://securities.stanford.edu. 
46 An offshore issuer, for example, faces language translation costs as well as the need to hire foreign coun-
sel among other costs. 
47 The Offer Amount 1st Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount is less than 1.5 
million dollars.  The Offer Amount 2nd Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount is greater 
than or equal to 1.5 million dollars and less than 5 million dollars.  The Offer Amount 3rd Quartile is defined to in-
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defined to include offerings of less than 1.5 million dollars, domestic private placement offerings 
involve issuers with a higher incidence of past private fraud litigation compared with offshore 
offerings (significant at the 10% level).  At the third and fourth largest offering amount quartiles, 
in contrast, offshore offerings involve issuers with a higher incidence of past private fraud litiga-
tion (significant at the 5% level).  Evidence at a summary statistic level exists, therefore, that fear 
of U.S. antifraud liability may factor into the decision to issue securities abroad for larger offer-
ing amounts where issuers benefit the most from avoiding liability. 
As an alternative specification, Panel D of Table 3 reports the pre-offering private fraud 
litigation experience of the non-public offerings categorized by the offering amount to market 
capitalization ratio quartile for the sample.48  From Panel D note that the comparison between 
domestic private placements and offshore offerings with respect to pre-offering private fraud liti-
gation incidence is qualitatively the same as for Panel C.  At higher offering amount to market 
capitalization ratio quartiles, offshore offerings involve issuers with a higher incidence of past 
private fraud litigation.  Nevertheless, the difference is significant at the 5% level only for the 
third largest quartile. 
Issuers in particular SIC code groupings with a high frequency of securities fraud litiga-
tion may also seek to sell abroad to reduce their exposure to liability.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys may 
focus on particular industry groupings due to the high fixed costs of learning about a particular 
industry.  Bohn and Choi (1996) found that certain 2-digit SIC code groups experienced a dis-
proportionate number of securities fraud class actions following an initial public offering.  The 
three 2-digit SIC code groupings Bohn and Choi (1996) reported to contain the highest frequency 
of securities fraud class actions – SIC 35 (Industrial Machinery and Equipment), SIC 36 (Elec-
                                                                                                                                                                                  
clude offerings where the offer amount is greater than or equal to 5 million dollars and less than 17.5 million dollars.  
The Offer Amount 4th Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount is greater than 17.5 million 
dollars.  The four quartiles are based on the distribution of offering amounts for the entire sample of offshore offer-
ings and domestic private placements. 
48 The Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 1st Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer 
amount to market capitalization ratio is less than 0.050.  The Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 2nd Quartile is 
defined to include offerings where the offer amount to market capitalization ratio is greater than or equal to 0.050 
and less than 0.112.  The Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 3rd Quartile is defined to include offerings where the 
offer amount to market capitalization ratio is greater than or equal to 0.112 and less than 0.223.  The Offer 
Amount/Market Capitalization 4th Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount to market capi-
talization ratio is greater than 0.223.  The four quartiles are based on the distribution of offering amount to market 
capitalization ratios for the entire sample of offshore offerings and domestic private placements. 
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tronic and Other Electronic Equipment), and SIC 73 (Business Enterprises) – are compared 
across offshore offering and private placement issuers in Panel E of Table 3.49  From Panel E 
note that 9.4% of the offshore offerings are from firms whose primary 2-digit SIC is group 35; in 
contrast, only 6.0% of private placements are from SIC code 35 (difference significant at the 5% 
level).  Similarly, 9.3% of the offshore offerings are from SIC code 36 compared with only 4.9% 
of the private placements (difference significant at the 5% level).  The difference for offerings 
where the issuer is a member of SIC code 73, in contrast, is not statistically significant. 
Panel E of Table 3 also reports the fraction of offshore offering and private placement is-
suers that are members of the 3-digit SIC 357 group, reported in Bohn and Choi (1996) as the 
three-digit SIC group with the highest frequency of securities fraud class actions.50  From Panel 
E note that 5.8% of the offshore offerings are from SIC 357 (Computer and Office Equipment) 
compared with 3.3% of the private placements (difference significant at the 5% level).  Compari-
son of the SIC code groups conducting non-public offerings therefore provides evidence at a 
summary statistic level consistent with the hypothesis that U.S. issuers may choose to conduct an 
offshore offering as opposed to a domestic private placement due to a fear of an antifraud action 
under the U.S. securities laws. 
As an alternative proxy for the importance of particular SIC code groups, Panel F of Ta-
ble 3 reports on two measures for the intensity of private fraud litigation by SIC code groups.  
Panel F first reports on the frequency of fraud litigation for the 2-digit SIC code group of the 
non-public offering’s issuer.  The frequency is obtained from Bohn and Choi and is defined as 
the total number of fraud class actions in the relevant 2-digit SIC code group targeting an initial 
public offering that took place from 1975 to 1986, the time period of the Bohn and Choi study.  
To the extent plaintiffs’ attorneys face a fixed cost in specializing in a particular industry, the 
absolute number of suits in a 2-digit SIC code group provides a measure for the intensity of 
plaintiffs’ attorney interest in the industry.  Second, Panel F reports on the incidence of securities 
fraud class actions for 2-digit SIC code group of the non-public offering’s issuer.  The incidence 
                                                        
49 See Bohn & Choi (1996: 940-941). 
50 In the sample of all initial public offerings from 1975 to 1986, Bohn and Choi found that 10% of the 
firms within SIC 357 experienced a securities fraud class action deriving out of their offering.  See Bohn & Choi 
(1996: 942-43). 
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is defined as the fraction of initial public offerings that faced a private fraud class action for the 
relevant 2-digit SIC code group as obtained from Bohn and Choi.  Note from Panel F that both 
the frequency and incidence measures of fraud suit intensity are greater for offshore offering is-
suers compared with domestic private placements (significant at the 5% level). 
 
4.  Testing the Motivation Behind Offshore Offerings 
 The fact that issuers decide to sell securities offshore in part to avoid the U.S. securities 
regime does not address the question of whether offshore offerings are beneficial or harmful for 
investors.  Issuers may desire to avoid U.S. securities regulation for at least two possible reasons.   
First, the costs of the U.S. antifraud regime may outweigh its benefits for certain issuers.  An is-
suer, for example, may be particularly vulnerable to non-meritorious lawsuits and therefore seek 
to issue securities offshore to avoid the cost of such potential lawsuits.  To the extent the first 
motivation is true, this provides evidence that the U.S. regulatory regime is not value maximiz-
ing for at least a subset of U.S. firms.  Second, issuers may seek to engage in an overseas offer-
ing to defraud investors.  Where the laws of other countries provide less antifraud protection than 
the United States’ regime, issuers may more easily engage in fraud.   
 This section tests the motivation of issuers in their choice of regime through an examina-
tion of: (1) the characteristics of the pre-offering fraud litigation for offshore and private place-
ment issuers; (2) the post-offering litigation experience of the issuers; and (3) the offering dis-
count negotiated with investors. 
 
4.1  Pre-Offering Fraud Litigation Characteristics 
 To test the hypothesis that issuers choose to offer securities offshore partly to escape the 
non-value maximizing application of U.S. antifraud liability, the paper compares characteristics 
of the set of offerings conducted by issuers that experienced a pre-offering securities fraud law-
suit consisting of a total of 167 offerings.   Issuers with a past SEC investigation history are 
taken as posing a higher risk to investors.  Both SEC investigations related to and unrelated to 
the prior private securities litigation are tracked as a signal to investors that the issuer may pose a 
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heightened risk of fraud.  SEC filings on Westlaw and Lexis and reports on PR-Newswire are 
also examined to determine whether the private securities fraud litigation was brought as a class 
action, the last reported resolution of the litigation and the number of years from the filing to the 
resolution of the suit (Resolution Time).   Where the litigation resulted in a settlement, the set-
tlement amount where available is obtained. 
 
 [Insert Table 4 Here]. 
 
Note from Panel A of Table 4 that 16.3% of the offshore offerings with pre-offering pri-
vate fraud litigation experience involved an issuer with a prior SEC investigation.  In compari-
son, 35.8% of the domestic private placements with pre-offering private litigation experience in-
volved an issuer with a past SEC investigation history (difference significant at the 1% level).  
Offshore offering issuers also had a reduced settlement rate (difference significant at the 10% 
level) and a conversely higher rate of dismissal or pro-defendant judgment (difference significant 
at the 10% level).  Pre-offering private fraud litigation for offshore offering issuers consisted of 
fewer class actions and reached resolution in a shorter time period (difference statistically insig-
nificant, however).  The mean settlement amount was also lower for offshore issuers compared 
to private placement issuers with pre-offering private fraud litigation experience (difference sta-
tistically insignificant). 
 The impact of private pre-offering fraud litigation on the corporate governance structure 
of the issuers is also tracked using two variables.  First, whether the CEO changed during the 
time period of the private litigation is determined through examination of the issuer’s SEC proxy 
filing for the year prior to the start of the fraud litigation and for 2 years after the start of the liti-
gation (New CEO).  In addition, the age of the CEO prior to the filing of the lawsuit is also ob-
tained from the SEC proxy filings (CEO age).  Second, the fraction of corporate officers on the 
board is compared one year prior to the start of the litigation and two years after the start of the 
litigation are obtained from proxy filings.  The change in the fraction of corporate officers on the 
board between the two time periods is then calculated. 
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From Panel B of Table 4 note that offshore offering issuers experienced a slightly greater 
turnover in the CEO position during the time period around the filing of the suit (difference not 
statistically significant).  For both domestic private placement and offshore offering issuers with 
pre-offering fraud experience, the fraction of corporate officers on the board of directors de-
creased.  The decrease is greater in magnitude for domestic private placement issuers; the differ-
ence, moreover, is statistically significant at the 10% level.  Some evidence exists, therefore, that 
the pre-offering litigation for domestic private placement issuers resulted in greater corporate 
governance changes than for offshore offering issuers, consistent with the hypothesis that more 
of the pre-offering private fraud actions for the offshore offering issuers were non-meritorious. 
Experience with a particular plaintiffs’ attorney may also influence the decision of an is-
suer with pre-offering fraud experience to issue securities offshore compared to a private place-
ment.  To the extent a particular plaintiffs’ attorney has expended the fixed cost expense of learn-
ing about a particular issuer, the plaintiffs’ attorney faces a reduced marginal cost to bring subse-
quent fraud suits.  Larger, well-financed plaintiffs’ attorneys may also expend resources to track 
former litigation defendants as potential future targets.   
Panel C of Table 4 reports whether the pre-offering litigation for both private placement 
and offshore offering issuers involves Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach (Milberg 
Weiss), the most active plaintiffs’ attorney firm in the sample time period, as one of the lead 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.  Milberg Weiss is one of the lead attorneys in 41.3% of the offshore offering 
issuers’ pre-offering fraud lawsuits and 31.6% of the private placement issuers’ pre-offering 
fraud lawsuits. The difference, however, is not statistically significant.  Rankings for plaintiffs’ 
and defense attorneys are also obtained from Forbes magazine based on the number of cases 
handled from 1988 to mid-1995.51  Whether one of the lead plaintiffs’ or defense attorney firms 
involved in the pre-offering fraud litigation is one of the top five plaintiffs’ or defense firms as 
determined through the Forbes rankings is reported in Panel C (denoted as Top 5 plaintiffs’ at-
                                                        
 51 See Nancy Rutter, Bill Lerach Thinks of Himself as Robin Hood In a Class-Action Suit, Forbes, Oct. 9, 
1995, at 116.  The Top 5 plaintiffs’ attorney firms listed in the Forbes article are:  Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes 
& Lerach (193 cases), Berger & Montague (87 cases), Abbey & Ellis (73 cases), Wolf, Popper, Ross, Wolf & Jones 
(59 cases), and Barrack, Rodos & Bacine (57 cases).  The Top 5 defense attorney firms are: Wilson, Sonsini, Good-
rich & Rosati (50 cases), Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom  (45 cases), Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (29 cases), 
Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe (22 cases), and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (16 cases). 
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torney or Top 5 defense attorney).52  Note that a Top 5 plaintiffs’ attorney is involved in 63.0% 
of the pre-offering fraud litigation for offshore offering issuers compared with 47.4% for private 
placement issuers (difference not statistically significant).   
Table 5 provides a more detailed breakdown of the Top 5 plaintiffs’ attorney firms. 
 
[Insert Table 5 Here]. 
 
Issuers may choose to offer securities abroad for a number of reasons unrelated to fraud-
related factors.  Companies may issue securities in geographical markets where they engage in 
business operations. Companies seeking to enter a new foreign market may desire to establish 
shareholder ties within those countries.  Greater shareholder awareness of the issuer may lead to 
greater demand for the issuer’s goods and services.  Furthermore, a presence in a foreign coun-
try’s capital market may lead the foreign government to act more favorably to the issuer.  As dis-
cussed in Choi (2000), insiders may also influence a company to sell securities abroad in a dis-
counted sale to themselves or to block shareholders sympathetic to management. Managers may 
find it easier to disguise sales to themselves or related parties offshore.  For example, insiders at 
two NASDAQ small cap companies, Comprehensive Environmental Systems, Inc. and ICIS 
Management Group Inc., attempted to sell discounted stock offshore to entities controlled by the 
insiders and then to resell the sale of these securities to brokerage accounts in the U.S. owned by 
the insiders.53 
To provide a multivariate test controlling for various factors that affect the decision to 
raise capital offshore, the paper estimates a logit model.  The logit model includes independent 
variables to assess the motivation of companies choosing to avoid U.S. securities regulation 
                                                        
52 The identities of the lead plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys are obtained, where available, from searches 
using the Westlaw and Lexis federal and state court decision databases as well as PR-NEWSWIRE, NEXIS, and 
SEC-Online databases. 
53 See Crime: Former SEC Lawyer, Others Indicted on Charges Over Reg S Securities, 28 Securities Regu-
lation & Law Report 1242, October 11, 1996.  Similarly, the chairman and CEO of Members Services Corp was 
convicted of securities fraud after causing Members to sell 1.4 million shares of unregistered stock under Regulation 
S to several entities controlled by the chairman.  The chairman then sold the Regulation S shares into the U.S. 
through the offshore entities into the United States at a substantial profit.  See Federal Securities & Corporate De-
velopments, 28 Securities Regulation & Law Report 605, May 10, 1996. 
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through an offshore offering including: (1) variables related to the risk of subsequent private 
fraud litigation, including both the SIC code grouping of the issuer and the prior private fraud 
litigation experience of the issuer.  The pre-offering SEC investigation experience, among other 
variables, is also included to gauge the importance of the risk of fraud on the decision where to 
raise capital.  In addition, (2) control variables are added to the model related to other factors that 
may influence the decision on the part of an issuer to sell securities abroad or through a domestic 
private placement.  The paper estimates the logit model presented below (where OFFSHORE = 1 
for an offshore offering and 0 for a domestic private placement):54 
 
)()1( 665544332211 εββββββα +++++++Λ== XXXXXXOFFSHOREprob  
 
1X  – Private Securities Fraud Litigation (Pre-Offering Fraud)  
2X  – Pre-Offering Fraud x SEC Investigation Interaction Term  
3X  – SEC Investigation Experience 
4X  – SIC Code Grouping  
5X  – Variations on Fraud-Related Risk Variables 
6X  – Control Variables 
 
The base logit model (reported as Model 1 in Table 6) first includes variables related to 
the risk of the offering to investors.  The base logit model includes a dummy variable ( 1X ) for a 
private securities fraud lawsuit targeting the issuer at any time from 10 years prior to the offering 
up to the start of the offering (Pre-Offering Fraud).   Past experience with private fraud litigation 
is taken as a proxy for the issuer’s expected cost of antifraud liability for offerings inside the 
United States.  An interaction term between Pre-Offering Fraud and a dummy variable for 
whether a SEC investigation occurred prior to the offering ( 2X ) is also added to the model.  Is-
suers that faced a SEC investigation, all other things being equal, may pose a greater risk of 
fraud to investors.  A dummy variable for SEC investigation ( 3X ) is also added to separate out 
the impact of past experience with a SEC investigation alone without the presence of prior pri-
                                                        
54 Ë(· ) is defined as [1 + exp(-â'X)]-1.  In the model, α  is the constant intercept term and ε  is the zero 
mean stochastic disturbance term. 
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vate fraud litigation.55  The base logit model also includes dummy variables ( 4X ) for the two-
digit SIC 35 (Industrial Machinery and Equipment), SIC 36 (Electronic and Other Electronic 
Equipment), and SIC 73 (Business Enterprises) groups.   
 Several variations are then estimated of the base logit model to assess further the impor-
tance of the fraud-risk related variables ( 5X ).  Model 1 is re-estimated using the sample of do-
mestic private placements and only those offshore offerings conducted by an issuer that did not 
also engage in a U.S.-targeted offering within five years prior to the offshore offering (reported 
as Model 2 of Table 6).  Because the paper’s sample of offshore offerings contain some issuers 
that also engaged in a relatively recent domestic offering of securities, the logit model may un-
derstate the differences between firms that choose to conduct solely an offshore offering and 
those that engage in domestic private placements.  Certain U.S. issuers, as well, may choose to 
raise capital abroad to diversify their shareholder base, taking advantage of foreign investors in-
terested in diversifying their portfolio compared with U.S. investors already saturated with the 
issuer’s shares.  Issuers may also choose to engage in an offshore offering because their sources 
of U.S. capital are overtaxed.  Removing issuers that made a U.S.-targeted offering within 5 
years of the offshore offering reduces the incidence of such types of offerings in the sample.   
Model 1 is re-estimated with the addition of an interaction term between Pre-Offering 
Fraud and a dummy variable for whether the pre-offering fraud litigation was dismissed or re-
sulted in a judgment for the defendants (reported as Model 3 of Table 6).  Lawsuits that are dis-
missed or that result in a pro-defendant judgment are more likely to be non-meritorious.   
Model 1 is re-estimated with the addition of an interaction term between Pre-Offering 
Fraud and a dummy variable for whether one of the lead plaintiffs’ attorneys is a Top 5 plain-
tiffs’ attorney (reported as Model 4 of Table 6).  Issuers may seek to sell securities abroad to the 
                                                        
 55 Among those issuers without a pre-offering history with a private antifraud action, SEC investigation 





Offering p-value a 
Fraction with SEC investigation experience 0.008 0.017 0.130 
** 5% level;  * 10% level. 
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extent past experience with a well-financed plaintiffs’ attorney may increase the risk of a subse-
quent suit for an offering inside the United States.   
Model 1 is re-estimated with the addition of an interaction term between Pre-Offering 
Fraud and a dummy variable for whether the offering occurred after the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) (reported as Model 5 of Table 6).  To the extent the PSLRA 
reduces the incentive of plaintiffs’ attorney to pursue a frivolous lawsuit, fewer U.S. issuers may 
use an offshore offering to escape U.S. regulation.   
Model 1 is finally re-estimated with the addition of the standard deviation of raw returns 
for the one-year period prior to the offering date as an independent variable in Model 6 of Table 
6.  Firms with a higher variation of their stock market return may be more likely to take into ac-
count potential U.S. antifraud liability.  To the extent plaintiffs’ attorneys focus on the stock 
price drop in their decision to bring suit, firms with a higher stock market return variance face a 
greater risk of attracting the attention of plaintiffs’ attorneys.   
The base logit model then includes a variety of controls in the 6X  variable.  First, the 
natural log of market capitalization, the fraction of shares in the hands of institutional investors, 
and the number of shareholders are added to the model.  All other things being equal, one would 
expect that companies with a greater shareholder following, market capitalization, and institu-
tional shareholder base will have more analysts tracking the company and therefore less asym-
metric information with respect to the market.  To the extent foreign investors start at a greater 
informational disadvantage relative to U.S. investors in valuing a U.S. issuer, the presence of 
analysts will reduce the informational disadvantage of foreign investors by a greater amount and 
thereby increase the probability of issuers choosing to sell securities abroad.   
Second, the natural log of the offering amount is added to the logit model.  Because do-
mestic private placements restrict the ability of issuers to sell large dollar amounts of securities 
into the United States through either direct limitations on the offering amount or restrictions on 
the number of non-accredited purchasers, issuers with relatively larger offerings may tend to 
choose an offshore offering.  On the other hand, as a substitute mechanism to control for the risk 
of fraud, offshore issuers may systematically sell to smaller numbers of more sophisticated in-
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vestors.  The natural log of the offering amount, therefore, may be reduced for offshore offerings 
compared with domestic private placements. 
 Third, companies may also choose to sell securities abroad because their business activi-
ties occur overseas.  This may take the form of either factories or other productive enterprises 
abroad or overseas export markets to which the company sells.  To capture this possibility, for 
each offshore offering and private placement, the number of countries in which the issuer either 
conducted operations or sold products and services is collected through examination of the 
“Business Description” section of each firm’s SEC 10-K filing concurrent with the offering year 
(World Contacts).56  The World Contacts variable is then included in both logit models.  One 
would expect that companies with a greater international presence would have an increased like-
lihood of selling securities abroad.57 
 Fourth, to control for the possibility that insider-favored sales may drive overseas offer-
ings as discussed in Choi (2000), the logit model includes the fraction of corporate officers on 
the board as well as the fraction of outstanding shares owned by officers and directors as inde-
pendent variables.  Firms with a higher degree of insider board representation, all other things 
being equal, will be more likely to sell discounted securities to insiders.  On the other hand, firms 
where managers own a significant fraction of shares will be less willing to bear the cost of sell-
ing discounted shares, all other things being equal.58   
                                                        
56 The article calculates the number of world contacts as follows:  For each specific country mentioned in 
the Form 10-K filing, the number of world contacts is increased by 1.  Where the issuer’s Form 10-K only discussed 
a particular continent, the average number of contacts other issuers in the article’s sample had in the particular con-
tinent conditional on the issuers’ having at least one contact is used as the number of contacts for that continent.   
For example, in the entire sample, companies that listed at least one country in Europe on average listed 5 European 
countries.  Issuers that listed Europe, therefore, have their number of world contacts increased by 5. 
57 On a summary statistic level, offshore offering issuers did not have a statistically significant different 
number of contacts with the world then private placement issuers 
 
             Table: Comparison of the Offshore Offering versus Domestic Private Placement Issuers 
Variable Private Placement Offshore Offering p-value a 
World Contacts 6.567 6.263 0.4629 
             ** 5% level; * 10% level .  
a The p-value is the value of a two-sided t-test of the difference in mean values between the private 
placement and offshore offering samples. 
58 As discussed later, a possible non-linearity may exist in the relationship between insider share ownership 
and the decision to issue securities offshore. 
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Fifth, the base logit model also includes a dummy variable for whether the offering is for 
common stock to control for any differences based on the type of security issued. 
 
[Insert Table 6 Here]. 
 
From Table 6 note first that the coefficient on the dummy variable for Pre-Offering Fraud 
Action experience is positive in all six models.  Moreover, the coefficient is significant at the 5% 
level in Models 1, 3 and 6, at the 10% level in Models 2 and 5, and insignificant in Model 4.  In 
comparison, the interaction term between Pre-Offering Fraud and the dummy variable for the 
presence of a SEC investigation is negative and significant at the 5% level in Models 1 through 5 
and at the 10% level in Model 6.  The results from Table 6 therefore provide evidence that issu-
ers may not all value U.S. regulatory protections equally.  To the extent a SEC investigation acts 
as a proxy for the heightened risk of the offering for investors, the results from Table 6 provide 
evidence that issuers posing such a risk tend to offer securities through a domestic private 
placement, obtaining the bonding and signaling benefits of the U.S. regime.  Other issuers that 
fear non-meritorious fraud lawsuits and that do not pose a heightened risk of fraud, on the other 
hand, may choose to issue securities abroad.  Both choices on the part of issuers are consistent 
with the voluntary regulation hypothesis that an issuer will subject itself to regulation where the 
joint benefits to the issuer and investors from such regulation exceeds the costs. 
In contrast, the dummy variable for a prior SEC investigation is positive but statistically 
insignificant in all six models.  Although the presence of a SEC investigation in combination 
with a past private fraud action increases the probability of a domestic offering, a SEC investiga-
tion alone does not.  The relatively low incidence of SEC investigation experience for firms 
without prior private fraud litigation experience may explain the statistically insignificant result.  
In addition, not all SEC investigations are alike.  Some may lead to an eventual civil or criminal 
legal proceeding; others may end without any finding of wrongdoing.  The paper’s data only in-
dicates the existence of some SEC investigation-related action without information on the result 
of the investigation.  The presence of a past private antifraud action may therefore signal a more 
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consequential SEC action or alternatively, a SEC action more directly related to the protection of 
investor welfare. 
Note from Model 2 in Table 6 that the omission of offshore offerings where the issuer 
conducted a prior U.S.-targeted offering within 5 years of the offshore offering in Model 2 does 
not qualitatively change the results of the other models.  The coefficient on the dummy variable 
for Pre-Offering Fraud is positive and significant at the 10% level in Model 2.  As well, the coef-
ficient on the interaction term between Pre-Offering Fraud and the dummy variable for a past 
SEC investigation is negative and significant at the 5% level in Model 2.   
Note also that the coefficient on the interaction term between Pre-Offering Fraud and the 
dummy variable for a dismissal or pro-defendant judgment for the pre-offering lawsuit is posi-
tive in Model 3.  The positive coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis that issuers that faced 
a frivolous suit in the U.S. tend to make greater use of offshore offerings.  Nevertheless, the co-
efficient on the interaction term between Pre-Offering Fraud and the dismissal or pro-defendant 
judgment dummy variable is not statistically significant. 
 Past experience with a Top 5 plaintiffs’ attorney law firm also increases the likelihood of 
an offshore offering.  The coefficient on the interaction term between Pre-Offering Fraud and the 
dummy variable for a Top 5 plaintiffs’ attorney law firm is positive and significant at the 5% 
level in Model 4.  On the other hand, the coefficient on the interaction term between Pre-
Offering Fraud and the dummy variable for the impact of the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act is negative although statistically insignificant as reported in Model 5 of Table 6. 
 The standard deviation of returns for the one-year prior to the offering is also a signifi-
cant factor in the decision to go abroad.  From Model 6 of Table 6 note that the coefficient on the 
standard deviation of returns is positive and significant at the 5% confidence level.  Firms with a 
higher standard deviation of returns are more likely to issue securities offshore, consistent with 
the hypothesis that fear of U.S. antifraud liability may drive some firms to issue securities out-
side the United States. 
 For each model in Table 6 a likelihood-ratio test is performed comparing the model 
against an identical model with the exclusion of dummy variables for prior private fraud litiga-
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tion or SEC investigation experience or any interaction terms with the dummy variables.  The 
null hypothesis that the fraud related variables as a group are insignificant is rejected at the 5% 
and 10% confidence levels for the models.59 
 Table 7 reports the calculated shift in probability of an offshore offering using Model 1 of 
Table 6 for offerings with only pre-offering private fraud litigation experience and with both pre-
offering private fraud and SEC investigation experience.  Note that the presence of pre-offering 
private litigation experience alone raises the probability of going offshore by 16.2 percentage 
points (using mean values for the other independent variables).  The presence of both pre-
offering private fraud litigation and a prior SEC investigation, in contrast, results in a 15.1 per-
centage point decrease in the probability of conducting an offshore offering. 
 Not reported, additional variations of Model 1 from Table 6 are estimated.  First, Model 1 
is fitted with year dummy variables using 1993 as the base year.  The coefficient on the Pre-
Offering Fraud variable is positive and significant at the 5% level while the coefficient on the 
interaction term between Pre-Offering Fraud and the SEC investigation dummy variable is nega-
tive and significant at the 5% level.  The year dummy variables are all positive and significant at 
the 5% level.   
Second, Model 1 is fitted with interaction terms between Pre-Offering Fraud and a 
dummy variable for the type of fraud allegation in the pre-offering fraud litigation using general 
disclosure fraud as the base case.60  None of the Pre-Offering Fraud x type of fraud allegation 
                                                        
59 Model 1, for example, predicts whether an offering is offshore or domestic with 63.6% accuracy.  With-
out the Pre-Offering Fraud and SEC Investigation dummy variables and any interaction terms with these variables, 
Model 1 predicts with only 61.3% accuracy.  The addition of the fraud-risk related variables increases the accuracy 
of the model by 2.3 percentage points. 
60 The following table provides a breakdown of the allegations in the pre-offering private fraud actions: 














General Disclosure Fraud 47 67.1% 54 71.1% 
Fraud Related to Public Offering 14 20.0 10 13.2 
Fraud Related to Private Placement 2 2.9 0 0.0 
Fraud Related to Acquisition 3 4.3 8 10.5 
Other 4 5.7 4 5.3 
Total 70 100.0% 76 100.0% 
        a Percentage of private placements where allegation is known. 
        b Percentage of offshore offerings where allegation is known. 
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interaction terms are statistically significant.  The coefficient on the Pre-Offering Fraud variable 
is positive and significant at the 5% level.  In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term be-
tween Pre-Offering Fraud and the SEC investigation dummy variable is negative and significant 
at the 5% level. 
Third, to control for possible a possible non-linearity in the relationship between director 
and officer share ownership and the probability of an offshore offering, Model 1 is also re-
estimated with the addition of a squared term for the fraction of common stock owned by direc-
tors and officers.  Not reported, the coefficient on the Pre-Offering Fraud dummy variable is 
positive and significant at the 5% level.  The coefficient on the interaction term between Pre-
Offering Fraud and the SEC investigation dummy variable is negative and significant at the 5% 
level. 
 Fourth, Model 1 is re-estimated using the Pre-Offering Fraud and SEC Investigation 
dummy variables and the Pre-Offering Fraud x SEC Investigation interaction term determined 
over the 5 years prior to the offering date rather than the prior 10 years.  To the extent more re-
cent fraud-related actions have a greater impact on both the fear of subsequent litigation on the 
part of managers and the risk of fraud facing investors, the use of fraud-related variables meas-
ured over the 5 years prior to the offering should result in more significant coefficients.  In the 
re-estimated model, however, the coefficient on the Pre-Offering Fraud variable is positive and 
significant at only the 20% level.  In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term between 
Pre-Offering Fraud and the SEC investigation dummy variable remains negative and significant 
at the 5% level. 
 To take into account the possibility that the desire to avoid antifraud liability is more im-
portant for larger offerings, four additional variations of Model 1 from Table 6 are estimated and 
reported in Table 8.  Model 1 of Table 8 replaces the dummy variable for Pre-Offering Fraud 
with four interaction dummy variables between Pre-Offering Fraud and the offering amount 
quartiles described in Panel C of Table 3.  Model 2 of Table 8 makes the same replacement with 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
The ÷2 test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the private placement and offshore offering distributions among 
pre-offering fraud action allegations are identical (÷2 = 5.187; prob. = 0.269). 
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interaction terms between Pre-Offering Fraud and the offering amount quartiles and adds both a 
dummy variable for the presence of a SEC investigation and an interaction term between Pre-
Offering Fraud and the presence of a SEC Investigation.  Model 3 of Table 8 replaces the 
dummy variable for Pre-Offering Fraud with four interaction dummy variables between Pre-
Offering Fraud and the offering amount/market capitalization quartiles described in Panel D of 
Table 3.  Model 4 of Table 8 makes the same replacement with interaction terms between Pre-
Offering Fraud and the offering amount/market capitalization quartiles and adds both a dummy 
variable for the presence of a SEC investigation and an interaction term between Pre-Offering 
Fraud and the presence of a SEC Investigation. 
 
 [Insert Table 8 Here]. 
 
 First note from Models 1 and 2 of Table 8 that the effect of Pre-Offering Fraud on the 
likelihood of a firm making an offshore offering is greatest and statistically significant (at the 5% 
level) only for the largest offer amount quartile.  The results of Table 8, therefore, confirm the 
results from Panel C of Table 3 that past history with a private antifraud action correlates more 
strongly with offshore offerings for larger dollar amount offerings.  Similarly, note from Model 4 
that the effect of Pre-Offering Fraud is greatest and statistically significant for the 3rd and 4th 
offer amount/market capitalization quartiles (significant at the 5% level for the 3rd quartile and 
the 10% level for the 4th quartile).  In Model 3, none of the offer amount/market capitalization 
quartiles are statistically significant.  Second, as reported in Models 2 and 4 of Table 8, even 
when controlling for the different offer amount and offer amount/market capitalization quartiles, 
the coefficients on the interaction terms between Pre-Offering Fraud and a prior SEC investiga-
tion are still negative and significant at the 5% level.  Although issuers with a prior history with 
private fraud litigation are more likely to sell securities offshore, those issuers that pose a 
particularly high risk to investors – as signaled through a past history of a SEC investigation – 
choose to expose themselves to the more stringent U.S. antifraud regime. 
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 For each model in Table 8, a likelihood-ratio test is performed comparing the model 
against an identical model with the exclusion of dummy variables for prior private fraud litiga-
tion or SEC investigation experience or any interaction terms with the dummy variables.  For 
Models 1 and 2, the null hypothesis that the fraud related variables as a group are insignificant is 
rejected at the 5% confidence level.  The likelihood-ratio test, however, fails to reject the null 
hypothesis for Models 3 and 4. 
 
4.2 Post-Offering Litigation Experience 
 To the extent issuers seek to raise capital offshore to reduce their exposure to potential 
non-meritorious litigation, one may expect a systematic difference in the post-offering litigation 
experience of issuers that conduct a domestic private placement compared with an offshore 
offering.  The post-offering private securities fraud litigation experience for each offshore 
offering issuer is tracked through examination of SEC filings on Westlaw and Lexis as well as 
press releases on PR-Newswire.  Only private securities fraud litigation filed during the first 
three years after the start of the offering are followed.  Note that all types of post-offering private 
fraud litigation are tracked regardless of whether the litigation relates to the non-public offering 
to gauge the overall risk of the issuer to investors.  Panel A of Table 9 reports the incidence of 
post-offering private securities fraud litigation for both domestic private placement and offshore 
offering issuers categorized by the pre-offering fraud experience of each issuer.   
 
[Insert Table 9 Here]. 
 
From Panel A of Table 9 note that issuers that conduct an offshore offering where the is-
suer has pre-offering fraud experience are more likely to also experience a post-offering private 
securities fraud lawsuit.  For 22.1% of the offshore offerings involving an issuer with pre-
offering fraud experience, the issuer also faced a post-offering private securities fraud action.  In 
contrast, for 8.6% of the private placements involving an issuer with pre-offering fraud experi-
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ence, the issuer also faced a post-offering private securities fraud action (difference significant at 
the 5% level). 
 The results in Panel A, nevertheless, are consistent with two possible hypotheses.  First, 
offshore offering issuers with pre-offering fraud experience may represent an enhanced likeli-
hood of actual fraud to all investors in the market.  The post-offering fraud suit experience of 
such issuers may therefore result directly from the raised level of actual fraud among such issu-
ers.  Second, offshore offering issuers with pre-offering fraud experience may present relatively 
low-cost targets for plaintiffs’ attorneys interested in pursuing non-meritorious litigation.  Al-
though an offshore offering reduces the exposure of such issuers to post-offering litigation, the 
high level of interest among plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking to bring a non-meritorious suit results in 
a higher post-offering incidence of litigation than for other types of issuers. 
 To distinguish between the two possible hypotheses explaining post-offering private se-
curities fraud litigation incidence, the paper examined the post-offering SEC investigation ex-
perience of each offerings’ issuer for a period of up to three years after the offering.  The post-
offering SEC investigation track record was obtained from SEC filings on Westlaw and Lexis as 
well as press releases on PR-Newswire.  All types of post-offering SEC investigations were 
tracked, regardless of their relation to the non-public offering to assess the issuer’s overall risk to 
investors.  Panel B of Table 9 reports the breakdown of post-offering SEC investigations. 
 Note that for 3.5% of the offshore offerings involving an issuer with pre-offering fraud 
action experience, the issuer also encountered a post-offering SEC investigation.  In comparison, 
for 2.5% of the domestic private placements involving an issuer with pre-offering fraud action 
experience, the issuer also faced a post-offering SEC investigation.  This difference, however, is 
not statistically significant.  Although offshore offering issuers with pre-offering fraud action 
experience face a significantly greater level of post-offering private antifraud actions, such issu-
ers do not face an elevated level of SEC investigations.  To the extent SEC investigations proxy 
for the risk of the issuer to investors, the results in Panel B are consistent with the hypotheses 
that offshore offerings issuers with pre-offering private fraud litigation experience did not pre-
   
  
   38
sent a significantly higher actual risk of fraud to investors.  Instead, such issuers may have exited 
the U.S. regime to avoid the cost of non-meritorious lawsuits.   
 At least two problems exist with the collection of post-offering SEC investigations, how-
ever.  First, some of the issuers in the sample may have dissolved or otherwise ceased to exist 
during the first three years after the offering.  To the extent offshore issuers with a prior private 
pre-offering fraud litigation history are more likely to dissolve, a downward bias may exist in the 
number of post-offering SEC investigations.  Second, the use of offshore offerings may have re-
duced the exposure of the offshore issuers to possible SEC enforcement with respect to the offer-
ings.  Although the SEC may investigate other aspects of the offshore issuers’ activities (e.g., 
periodic disclosures), the paper cannot rule out the possibility that the offshore issuers would 
have had a significantly higher level of SEC investigation activity if they had issued securities 
domestically. 
 
4.3 Comparison of the Offering Discount 
 This section examines the discount that purchasers of non-public offerings of common 
stock receive relative to the secondary market price measured at the start date of the offering to 
distinguish between possible issuer motivations in avoiding U.S. securities regulation through an 
offshore offering.61  Examination of the offering discount provides one gauge of the value of 
U.S. securities regulatory protection for investors.  In particular, this section tests the hypothesis 
that issuers choosing to remain within the U.S. regulatory regime receive a reduced offering dis-
count and therefore benefit from this choice.  Without the assistance of U.S. antifraud liability to 
bond the value of the offering, investors may require a greater discount to invest in an offshore 
offering.  Panel A of Table 10 reports summary information on the actual offering discount for 
domestic private placements and offshore offerings of common stock.   
 
                                                        
61 The offering discount is defined as: 
 
Offering Discount   =   U.S. Secondary Market Price at Start of Offering   -   Offering Price 
                           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           U.S. Secondary Market Price at Start of Offering 
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 [Insert Table 10 Here]. 
 
The comparison of the mean offering discount for offshore offerings and domestic private 
placements provides evidence that investors face a greater risk of fraud from offshore offerings.  
For the set of common stock offerings in the sample, for example, offshore offerings experienced 
a 29.4% mean discount while private placements into the United States received only a 17.4% 
mean discount (difference significant at the 1% level).  The 17.4% discount for domestic private 
placements in the paper’s sample is consistent with other studies of U.S. private placements.  
Hertzel, Linck, and Rees (1999) in a study of 183 equity private placements in the United States, 
for example, report a mean discount of 15.9%.  Issuers that voluntarily choose to remain within 
the United States therefore receive a reduced offering discount of 12 percentage points. 
 The difference in the mean discount for offshore offerings and domestic private place-
ments, however, may be due to factors other than differences in regulatory protections.  Investors 
may desire a discount to compensate for the illiquidity imposed for securities purchased through 
a non-public offering.  Larger offerings that provide the possibility of a secondary market off-
shore may require a reduced discount compared to smaller offerings without such a possibility, 
for example.  Investors may also demand a greater discount based on the risk investors perceive 
from participating in such an offering.  Companies better followed by investment analysts, for 
example, may pose a lower risk of fraud than unknown companies without such a following.   
To control for various factors that may affect the offering discount, the paper follows a 
two-step process.  First, an ordinary least squares model of the offering discount is estimated for 
only offshore offerings of common stock.  Second, the discount investors would demand for the 
domestic private placements had they been offered offshore (called the “predicted offshore dis-
count”) is calculated from the estimated model.  The model is presented below:62 
                                                        
62 In the model, α  is the constant intercept term and ε  is the zero mean stochastic disturbance term.  The 
model had an adjusted R2 equal to 0.1369 with 191 observations (t-statistic in parenthesis).   
 
DISCOUNT = 0.061 – 0.067LNMKTCAP – 0.058LNOMKT – 0.001SHLDERS – 0.048BINSIDER 
                        (3.859)   (-3.904)                      (-3.532)                   (-0.017)                  (-0.396) 
 
+ 0.106MDHOLD –0.069MDHOLD^2 + 0.007TOBINQ – 0.242YR94 – 0.218YR95 – 0.323YR96 
   (0.304)                   (-0.135)                     (1.883)                 (-1.855)          (-1.682)          (-2.525)                    
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DISCOUNT = á + â1LNMKTCAP + â2LNOMKT + â3SHLDERS + â4BINSIDER 
+ â5MDHOLD + â6MDHOLD^2 + â7TOBINQ + â8YEAR_DUMMIES + 
â9SIC_DUMMIES + å 
 
The model incorporates five categories of variables affecting the offering discount in-
cluding variables on: (a) liquidity; (b) the degree of information asymmetry between investors 
and the company’s management; (c) the incentive of managers to use a non-public offering to 
engage in opportunistic, discounted securities sales to related entities; (d) the Tobin’s Q measure 
for the issuer; and (e) dummy variable controls for the year of the offshore offering and the 2-
digit SIC code of the issuer. 
First, securities sold through either an offshore offering or a private placement are gener-
ally not freely transferable inside the United States.  Investors therefore will demand a discount 
for the illiquidity risk they bear from a non-public offering.63  Importantly, the precise degree of 
illiquidity will depend on that availability of information on the issuer and the interest of institu-
tional investors in the issuer’s securities.  Investors, for example, may conduct immediate resales 
pursuant to Rule 144A of the Securities Act (requiring, among other things, that the resales are 
made to Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs).64  The greater the market capitalization, the easier 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
– 0.333YR97 + 0.046SIC13 – 0.017SIC28 – 0.122SIC35 + 0.072SIC36 – 0.050SIC38 – 0.130SIC48 
 (-2.617)          (0.473)           (-0.262)            (-1.877)           (1.214)            (-0.743)          (-0.948)                
 
+ 0.014SIC73 + 0.275SIC80  + å            
 (0.192)             (1.774) 
 
In addition, the model is re-estimated with only those offshore offerings involving an issuer that did not 
conduct a U.S.-targeted offering within 5 years of the offshore offering.  Issuers that conduct both U.S. and offshore 
offerings may use an offshore offering for purposes other than to exit the U.S. regime (adj. R2 = 0.0800; 159 obser-
vations).  In the re-estimated model, the predicted offshore discount for the domestic private placement firms is 
equal to 25.6%.  The difference between the actual discount and the predicted offshore discount is significant at the 
1% level. 
63 Compared with private placements, offshore offerings during the data set’s time period impose a reduced 
liquidity risk due to the ability of foreign investors to resell after only 40-days valid for the offshore offerings in the 
paper’s data time period.  All other things being equal, therefore, one would expect a lower offering discount for 
offshore offerings due to illiquidity. 
64 Rule 144A(a)(1) of the Securities Act defines a Qualified Institutional Buyer as an institutional entity that 
"in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers that are not 
affiliated with the entity . . . ." Rule 144A(a)(1)(i), Securities Act.  Dealers registered pursuant to Section 15 of the 
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time investors will have in finding a QIB willing to trade the issuer’s securities.  The OLS model 
therefore includes the natural log of the issuer’s market capitalization (LNMKTCAP).   
Foreign investors, as well, may conduct resales to other foreign investors pursuant to 
Rule 905 of the Securities Act.  The restrictions on resales into the United States placed on secu-
rities sold through an outside the United States, therefore, impose a greater illiquidity risk on in-
vestors of companies without a substantial overseas trading market for the securities.  The 
greater the offering amount relative to the market capitalization, the more likely that a trading 
market may develop overseas.  The OLS model therefore includes the natural log of the offering 
amount to market capitalization ratio as an independent variable (LNOMKT).   
Second, the offering discount depends on the informational disadvantage at which inves-
tors may find themselves.  Managers, for example, may systematically offer securities when the 
secondary market overvalues the issuer (Myers and Majluf, 1984), leading investors to require a 
greater offering discount in compensation.  Investors at a large informational disadvantage, in 
turn, may have a greater fear that the offered securities are overvalued.  The model uses the natu-
ral log of the issuer’s market capitalization and the number of shareholders (SHDLERS) as a 
control for the degree of informational asymmetry.  The greater the market capitalization and 
number of shareholders, the larger is the likelihood that one or more securities analysts follow 
the issuer and transmit information on the company to the rest of the market. 
Third, as Choi (2000) discusses, to the extent the identity of the purchaser is hard to de-
termine in an offshore offering, managers may use an offshore offering to engage in self-dealing, 
resulting in an increased overall discount for such offerings.  To control for this possibility, the 
fraction of board seats held by officers (BINSIDER) as well as the fraction of outstanding com-
mon stock beneficially owned by directors and officers are added to the model (MDHOLD).  
Firms with greater concentrations of insiders on the board are more likely to engage in sales on 
favored terms to insiders.  Conversely, firms where the insiders already own a significant portion 
of the equity will be less likely to use offshore offerings to sell themselves securities at a dis-
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Exchange Act must meet only a $10 million requirement.  See Rule 144A(a)(1)(ii), Securities Act.   For the securi-
ties of non-Exchange Act reporting issuers, the purchaser has the right to demand certain specified information at its 
discretion. Rule 144A(d)(4), Securities Act.   
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count.  As discussed earlier in the paper, a possible non-linearity exists in the relationship be-
tween insider ownership of equity and the discount in an offshore offering.  The model therefore 
includes a squared term for insider beneficial ownership of equity (MDHOLD^2). 
Fourth, the model includes the Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ) measure of how much the market 
values the issuer’s assets over its book value.65  All other things being equal, investors will de-
mand a greater discount from firms that present a higher risk.  Investors, nevertheless, may al-
ready discount the secondary market price for the risk, reflected as a lower Tobin’s Q.  When the 
issuer sells securities abroad, the secondary market price may then display no further discount-
ing.  Firms with a low Tobin’s Q, therefore, may not experience as great a discount.  In the alter-
native, a high Tobin’s Q may indicate that the firm has a large amount of growth opportunities.  
To the extent such growth opportunities are risky, investors may demand a greater discount than 
for a firm whose valuation is less dependent on such opportunities. 
Finally, the model includes dummy variables for the year of the offering (with 1993 as 
the base year) to control for year-specific effects (YEAR_DUMMIES).  The model also includes 
dummy variables for whether the issuer of the offering is a member of one of the two-digit SIC 
code groups with at least 3% of the total number of non-public offerings in the sample to control 
for industry-specific effects (SIC_DUMMIES). 
Panel B of Table 10 reports summary statistics on both the actual discount and the pre-
dicted offshore discount for the domestic private placements.  From Panel B of Table 10 note 
that the mean and median predicted offshore discounts are greater than the mean and median ac-
tual discounts for domestic private placements.  The mean predicted offshore discount is 6.3 per-
centage points greater than the actual discount.66  The difference between the mean predicted off-
shore discount and actual discount is significant at the 1% level.  The mean offering amount for 
domestic private placements of common stock is $16.87 million, giving domestic private place-
                                                        
65 Tobin’s Q is defined as (market value of equity + book-value of long-term debt + book-value of short-
term debt + preferred stock at carrying value) divided by book value of assets. 
66 Note that the predicted offshore discount may understate the amount of discount due to regulatory differ-
ences.  Securities purchased through a domestic private placement faced a two-year holding period during which 
resales into the public capital markets are restricted for the sample time period.  In comparison, offshore offerings of 
equity securities faced only a 40-day restricted period before resales may commence in the United States during the 
sample time period.  All other things being equal, therefore, one would expect a lower offshore discount in compari-
son with a domestic private placement. 
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placement issuers an average gain of $1.06 million from issuing securities inside the United 
States. 
Despite the higher mean discount for offshore offerings, substantial differences exist in 
the regulatory regime of foreign countries.  Although the U.S. regime is widely recognized as the 
most stringent across the world, other regions including most notably Europe, employ a compa-
rable level of securities disclosure requirements combined with a lack of private class actions.67  
Panel A of Table 11 presents the actual mean offshore discounts for the different regions, where 
known.  The geographical location of the majority of offshore offerings in the data set, however, 
is unknown.68  Moreover, because issuers voluntarily self-report the geographical location of the 
offering, the sub-sample of offerings where the geographical location is known may not be rep-
resentative of the entire sample of offerings.   
 
[Insert Table 11 Here]. 
 
Nevertheless, to obtain a sense of the predicted offshore discount for different regions 
offshore, the paper re-estimated the offshore discount model with the addition of dummy vari-
ables for Europe, Canada, Asia, and Latin America (with Other regions, including Africa and the 
Middle East, as the base).69  Predicted offshore discounts were then obtained for the domestic 
                                                        
67 See Per Henrik Lindblom, Individual Litigation and Mass Justice: A Swedish Perspective and Proposal 
on Group Actions in Civil Procedure, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 805, 817 – 22 (1997) (describing the lack of private class 
action style litigation in Europe).  For a description of the securities regulatory regimes of the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Australia see Marc I. Steinberg and Lee E. Michaels, Disclo-
sure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 Mich. 
J. Int'l L. 207 (1999).   One of the primary differences between U.S. and European disclosures lies with accounting 
standards.  As well, although Europe provides issuers with comparable disclosure requirements as within the United 
States, issuers are not subject to private class actions within Europe.   
68 The geographical regions for only 192 out of the 693 offshore offerings are known: 
 Region 
Number of  
Offerings 
Fraction of Offerings 
(Where Region Known) 
Asia 20   0.104 
Europe 125 0.651 
Canada 15 0.078 
Latin America 36 0.188 
Other 9 0.047 
 
69 The model had an adjusted R2 equal to 0.1400 with 191 observations (t-statistic in parenthesis).   
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private placements assuming the offerings were conducted in, alternatively, the different offshore 
regions.   Panel B of Table 11 presents the predicted offshore discounts for the different regions.  
Note that for all the offshore regions except for Canada, the predicted offshore discount is greater 
than the actual discount for the domestic private placement issuers.  Moreover, the difference is 
greatest for offerings to Latin America and the Other regions (difference significant at the 1% 
level).  Given a mean offering amount for domestic private placements of common stock of 
$16.87 million, domestic private placement issuers would have borne a $0.42 million additional 
cost on average for offerings to Europe.  In contrast, domestic private placement issuers would 
have experienced an additional cost of $1.55 million on average for offerings to the Other re-
gions. 
As one final test of the hypothesis that higher risk issuers voluntarily choose to remain 
within the U.S. regime to avoid a large offshore discount, the paper re-estimates the offshore dis-
count model with the addition of dummy variables capturing the issuer’s past private and public 
fraud action experience.  A dummy variable for the presence of a private fraud action (PRE-
FRAUD) within ten years of the offshore offering is included.  Similarly, a dummy variable for 
the presence of a public SEC investigation within ten years of the offshore offering is included 
(SEC).  To capture firms that faced both a public and private fraud-related action, a PREFRAUD 
x SEC interaction term is also added to the model.  Insufficient variation exists between the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
DISCOUNT = 0.580 – 0.059LNMKTCAP – 0.053LNOMKT – 0.001SHLDERS – 0.024BINSIDER 
                        (3.623)   (-3.249)                     (-3.144)                  (-0.174)                  (-0.196) 
 
+ 0.108MDHOLD – 0.090MDHOLD^2 + 0.006TOBINQ – 0.206YR94 – 0.191YR95 – 0.280YR96 
   (0.311)                   (-0.177)                     (1.646)                 (-1.562)          (-1.460)          (-2.143)                    
 
– 0.282YR97 + 0.025SIC13 – 0.011SIC28 – 0.122SIC35 + 0.088SIC36 – 0.053SIC38 – 0.151SIC48 
 (-2.159)          (0.250)           (-0.164)            (-1.843)           (1.465)            (-0.761)           (-1.098)            
 
+ 0.005SIC73 + 0.279SIC80  – 0.068EUROPE – 0.131CANADA – 0.072ASIA – 0.022LAMER + å                   
 (0.071)            (1.797)             (-1.338)                 (-1.368)                  (-0.789)          (-0.299) 
 
In addition, the model is re-estimated with only those offshore offerings involving an issuer that did not 
conduct a U.S.-targeted offering within 5 years of the offshore offering.  Issuers that conduct both U.S. and offshore 
offerings may use an offshore offering for purposes other than to exit the U.S. regime (adj. R2 = 0.0760; 159 obser-
vations).  In the re-estimated model, the predicted offshore discount for the domestic private placement firms as-
sumed to target Europe is equal to 22.2%.  The difference between the actual discount and the predicted offshore 
discount is significant at the 5% level. 
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dummy variables for a prior SEC investigation and the different reported geographical regions.  
The re-estimated model, as a result, excludes the geographical region dummy variables.70 
  From the re-estimated model, the paper then calculates the predicted offshore discount 
for the domestic private placement firms.  To examine the direct impact of fraud risk on the dis-
count, the paper divides the sample of domestic private placements based on the risk of fraud 
they pose to investors.  In particular, firms that faced both a prior SEC investigation and a prior 
private fraud action pose the greatest risk to investors of fraud.  The sample is therefore divided 
based on whether the interaction term PREFRAUD x SEC is equal to 1 (classified as “high-risk” 
offerings) or 0 (classified as “low-risk” offerings).  To the extent U.S. securities regulatory pro-
tection reduce the risk of high-risk offerings, investors will not demand as great an increase in 
the discount compared with low-risk offerings.  Table 12 reports of the actual discount and the 
predicted offshore discount for domestic private placement offerings based on their degree of 
fraud risk. 
 
[Insert Table 12 Here]. 
 
 From Table 12 note that the actual discount for domestic private placements does not 
vary significantly between the high and low-risk categories of offerings.  The actual discount for 
                                                        
70 The model had an adjusted R2 equal to 0.1256 with 191 observations (t-statistic in parenthesis).   
 
DISCOUNT = 0.607 – 0.068LNMKTCAP – 0.058LNOMKT – 0.001SHLDERS – 0.050BINSIDER 
                        (3.751)   (-3.914)                     (-3.503)                   (-0.055)                  (-0.416) 
 
+ 0.112MDHOLD –0.077MDHOLD^2 + 0.018PREFRAUD + 0.111PREFRAUD x SEC + 0.085SEC 
   (0.318)                   (-0.150)                      (0.269)                        (0.302)                                  (0.324) 
 
+ 0.007TOBINQ – 0.245YR94 – 0.212YR95 – 0.317YR96 – 0.328YR97 + 0.047SIC13 – 0.019SIC28  
   (1.919)                 (-1.835)          (-1.600)         (-2.427)          (-2.491)          (0.476)           (-0.306) 
 
– 0.137SIC35 + 0.073SIC36 – 0.051SIC38 – 0.134SIC48 + 0.015SIC73 + 0.269SIC80  + å            
  (-2.015)           (1.224)            (-0.757)           (-0.965)          (0.199)           (1.679) 
                      
In addition, the model is re-estimated with only those offshore offerings involving an issuer that did not 
conduct a U.S.-targeted offering within 5 years of the offshore offering.  Issuers that conduct both U.S. and offshore 
offerings may use an offshore offering for purposes other than to exit the U.S. regime (adj. R2 = 0.0760; 159 obser-
vations).  In the re-estimated model, the predicted offshore discount for the domestic private placement firms as-
sumed to target Europe is equal to 25.9%.  The difference between the actual discount and the predicted offshore 
discount is significant at the 1% level. 
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low-risk offerings is 17.4% while the actual discount for high-risk offerings is 17.1% (difference 
statistically insignificant).  The lack of difference in the actual discount is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that U.S. securities regulations reduce the risk of high-risk offerings, leading investors 
not to demand a greater discount.  On the other hand, the predicted offshore discount varies sig-
nificantly.  The predicted offshore discount for low-risk offerings is 22.4% while the predicted 
offshore discount for high-risk offerings is 38.3% (difference significant at the 1% level).  The 
differential in the predicted offshore discount for high-risk offerings is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that regulatory protections offshore provide a lower level of investor protections.  Al-
though inside the United States investors do not demand a greater discount for offerings where 
the issuer has a high-risk past history, offshore investors demand on average a 15.9 percentage 
point greater discount.  The mean offering amount for high-risk domestic private placements of 
common stock is $16.90 million, giving high-risk domestic issuers an additional potential loss of 
$2.69 million on average had they chosen to issue outside the United States compared with low-
risk domestic issuers. 
To the extent different regions provide a different discount compared to offerings in the 
United States, however, the variation among predicted offshore discounts may not be due to 
fraud-related factors but rather the selection of a different geographical region for the offering.  
For example, offerings reported as taking place in Asia received a mean actual discount of 
26.6%.  It is possible that, for example, a prior SEC investigation correlates with offshore issuers 
selecting non-European geographical regions.  The reduced discount, therefore, may not be due 
to the prior SEC investigation itself but rather exist because of the correlation between a prior 
SEC investigation and the selection of a non-European geographical region.71  
 The offering discount measured using the secondary market price at the start date of the 
offering may also include a discount for the expected negative market reaction to news of the 
offering.  Kang et al. (1995) find a –1.35% negative abnormal return for the announcement for 
                                                        
71 No evidence of such a correlation, nevertheless, exists in the data sample.  Of the 24 offshore offerings 
involving an issuer with a past SEC investigation, the geographical region for 20 of the offerings is unknown.  
Among the known offerings, 2 target Europe (representing 1.6% of the reported European offerings) and 3 target 
non-European regions (representing 4.6% of the non-European offerings).  The difference in incidence for offerings 
involving an issuer with a past SEC investigation is not statistically significant between Europe and the non-
European regions (prob. = 0.2201). 
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offshore U.S. convertible debt issues. On the other hand, Wruck (1989) finds a positive secon-
dary market reaction to news of a domestic equity private placement.  The paper therefore recal-
culates the offering discount minus the expected market reaction (termed the “residual discount”) 
to gauge the importance of fraud-risk related factors in the negotiated discount without regard to 
the expected market reaction.  As a proxy for the expected market reaction, the paper uses the 
actual 8-week cumulative excess return after the start date of the offering estimated using the 
market model.72  The 8-week time window is constructed to coincide with the end of the 40-day 
restricted period relevant for offerings during the article’s sample time period.  The market is as-
sumed at the latest to learn about the offering once resales commence from abroad into the 
United States.73  
Use of the calculated residual discount provides results similar to the paper’s tests using 
the full negotiated offering discount.  The actual mean residual discount for low-risk offerings is 
15.6% while the actual mean residual discount for high-risk offerings is 16.0% (difference statis-
tically insignificant).  The lack of a statistically significant difference is consistent with the lack 
of difference for the actual offering discount between high and low-risk domestic offerings.  To 
determine the predicted residual offshore discount, the model in Table 12 is re-estimated using 
the residual offshore discount as the dependent variable.  Using the model, the predicted mean 
residual offshore discount for low-risk offerings is 19.6% while the predicted mean residual off-
                                                        
72 The market model treats the return for any security as a function of the total market return.  For security 
i, for example, the expected return for time period t ( itR ) is equal to: 
 
itmtiit RR εβα ++=  
 
Where mtR  is the market return and itε  is the zero mean disturbance term.  A value-weighted return based 
on all the securities trading on the exchange in which the issuer’s securities are listed is used for the market return.  
The value-weighted return for all NASDAQ securities is used for securities trading on NASDAQ.  For each security, 
returns from -260 trading days to -20 trading days prior to the start of the offering are used to estimate the parame-
ters of the market model.  Daily secondary market returns are obtained from the Center for Research on Security 
Prices (“CRSP”). 
73 The market, of course, may learn of the offering at a point earlier than 8-weeks after the start of the offer-
ing.  After November 18, 1996, for instance, the SEC required issuers to reveal all equity-related Regulation S offer-
ings under Item 9 of Form 8-K within 15 days of the offering.  See Item 9 of Form 8-K, Exchange Act.  See SEC, 
Periodic Reporting of Unregistered Equity Sales, Release No. 34-37801 (October 10, 1996).  For offerings con-
ducted after the SEC’s 1996 reforms, therefore, the paper’s event windows may be larger than necessary.  As a re-
sult, the expanded event windows may bias against finding a significant abnormal market reaction.   
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shore discount for high-risk offerings is 27.9%.  Although a 8.3 percentage point difference ex-
ists between the predicted residual offshore discounts for high and low-risk offerings had they 
gone abroad, the difference is significant at only the 20% confidence level. 
  
5.  Conclusion 
The paper presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis that at least a subset of U.S. 
firms issue equity abroad to avoid exposure to U.S. fraud litigation.  Issuers with a past history of 
private securities fraud litigation and issuers in industries particularly prone to class action suits 
are more likely to go overseas. Some issuers may find that the costs outweigh the benefits asso-
ciated with the U.S. antifraud liability regime, due to non-meritorious lawsuits for example.  On 
the other hand, issuers with a past history of private securities fraud litigation that also faced a 
past SEC investigation are more likely to issue equity within the United States. Such firms may 
value the U.S. legal regime as a means of bonding themselves to make only completely truthful 
statements to investors.  Alternatively, the selection of the U.S. legal regime may help signal the 
quality of the issuer’s offering to investors to the extent offerings posing a higher risk of fraud 
face an increased cost from selecting the U.S. regime. 
The paper’s results are subject to a number of caveats.  First, the logit model of the deci-
sion to offer securities offshore may fail to control for all relevant factors.  Many issuers, for ex-
ample, base their decision as to where to raise capital upon factors unrelated to regulatory con-
siderations, including for example the liquidity of different markets.  The paper’s hypothesis, 
nevertheless, is not that all issuers view antifraud liability as the most significant or even a pri-
mary consideration.  Rather, the paper’s hypothesis is that for the subset of issuers where anti-
fraud liability makes a difference, issuers choose where to offer securities based on the regime 
that best maximizes value to investors. 
Second, even to the extent issuers may use offshore offerings to mitigate the risk of anti-
fraud liability that may result in frivolous litigation, other aspects of the U.S. regime may remain 
beneficial for investors.  In particular, insiders may use offshore offerings to conceal sales of se-
curities at discounted prices to entities affiliated with the insiders.  The paper’s findings relate 
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only to the value of U.S. antifraud regulatory provisions for purchasers during an offering.  Nev-
ertheless, regulators may seek to target specifically managerial opportunism in offshore offer-
ings.  For example, as I have argued elsewhere (Choi, 2000), regulators may force managers to 
disclose in-depth information on the identity of the offshore purchaser as well as specific details 
on the intended use of the proceeds from the offering.  With more specific provisions targeting 
managerial opportunism, regulators may then allow issuers more freely to exit other aspects of 
the U.S. securities regime designed to protecting purchasing investors in an offering. 
Third, the paper focuses only on the choice between offshore offerings and domestic pri-
vate placements.  Issuers, in fact, may choose from a variety of options to raise capital including 
public offerings and debt financing.  Each alternative represents a different level of exposure to 
the U.S. regulatory regime.  Further study examining the antifraud litigation experience of issu-
ers that choose the greater regulatory protections associated with a subsequent U.S. registered 
public offering may help verify the possibility that certain issuers adopt the U.S. regime to signal 
that they are acting truthfully with investors. 
The paper nonetheless offers evidence that concern with possible exposure to U.S. anti-
fraud liability affects the decision on the part of issuers to raise capital either offshore or within 
the United States.  Moreover, the paper’s evidence supports the voluntary regulation hypothesis 
that issuers bear good incentives to select investor protections based on the preferences of poten-
tial investors.  In particular, issuers that pose an increased risk of fraud, as signaled through past 
experience with both a private fraud action and a SEC investigation, tend to remain within the 
U.S. regime voluntarily.74  Some issuers, of course, may continue to seek to engage in fraud un-
der a voluntary system of regulation; investors, as well, may not accurately interpret the signal 
sent from the selection of a particular regulatory regime of the risk of fraud.  Nevertheless, the 
                                                        
74 The paper’s results are consistent with anecdotal evidence in support of the voluntary regulation hy-
pothesis.  In Germany, the Neuer Markt, a subsidiary of the Deutsche Bourse, experienced rapid growth in the num-
ber of listed companies and trading volume in large part due to the imposition through private contract of U.S.-style 
disclosures for listed companies.  See Vanessa Fuhrmann, Playing by the Rules: How Neuer Markt Gets Respect, 
Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 2000, at C1.  Similarly, Jackson and Pan (2000) conducted a series of in-depth interviews with 
50 European financial professionals in 1999 to determine the factors that affect the choice among different European 
securities markets.  Jackson and Pan report that the interviewed financial professionals indicated that increased secu-
rities disclosure above the level legally required is commonly required due to market forces.   
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paper’s results raise the possibility that regulators may wish to consider expanding the circum-
stances under which issuers may opt out of antifraud liability.   
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Table 1 
Summary of the Disclosure and Antifraud Requirements Placed on Different  
Types of Offerings under the U.S. Securities Laws 
 
 
 Public Offering Private Placement Offshore Offering 
Required  
Disclosure 
• Extensive disclosure as 
required under, among 
others, Forms S-1, S-2, or 
S-3 of the Securities Act 
• Limited disclosure un-
der Rule 502(b) of the 
Securities Act to the ex-
tent securities offered to 
non-accredited investors 







• Sections 11, 12(a)(2) of 
the Securities Act 
 
• Rule 10b-5 of the 
Exchange Act  
 
• Rule 10b-5 of the  
Exchange Act 
• Rule 10b-5 subject mat-
ter jurisdiction only if 
conduct or effects inside 
the United States 
 
• Forum-selection and 
choice of law clauses 
limit liability exposure 
 
• Greater difficulty in 
maintaining a class action 
with foreign class mem-
bers.  Individual foreign 




SEC Enforcement • Possible SEC Enforce-
ment  
 
• Possible SEC Enforce-
ment 
• Resources devoted pri-
marily to transactions 
where U.S. investors po-
tentially may be harmed 
(e.g., through rapid re-
sales of offshore securities 
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Table 2 
Sample Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A:  Frequency of Non-Public Offerings From 1993 to 1997 

























1993 139 150 26 30 113 120 
1994 187 205 76 86 111 119 
1995 195 219 105 120 90 99 
1996 359 440 170 244 189 196 
1997 362 430 159 213 203 217 
Total 1242 1444 536 693 706 751 




Panel B: Breakdown of Offerings by Security Type 
Security 











Common 784 54.3% 12.5 3.0 
Preferred Non-Convertible 23 1.6 23.8 8.3 
Preferred Convertible 330 22.9 51.4 9.8 
Debt Convertible 307 21.3 59.0 7.5 





Panel C: Breakdown of Offerings by Security and Offering Type 
Security 










Common 403 53.7% 381 55.0% 
Preferred Non-Convertible 19 2.5% 4 0.6% 
Preferred Convertible 230 30.6% 100 14.4% 
Debt Convertible 99 13.2% 208 30.0% 
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NYSE 158 11.0% 141.0 80.6 
AMEX 80 5.5 13.4 4.9 
NASDAQ 1204 83.5 19.7 4.0 





Panel E:  Breakdown of Non-Public Offerings by 2-Digit SIC Code 
SIC Code Frequency Percentage SIC Code Frequency Percentage 
1 1     0.07% 45 15     1.08% 
7 2 0.14 47 2 0.14 
10 21 1.51 48 75 5.41 
13 53 3.82 49 33 2.38 
14 4 0.29 50 41 2.96 
15 3 0.22 51 28 2.02 
17 4 0.29 53 5 0.36 
20 16 1.15 54 6 0.43 
22 1 0.07 55 8 0.58 
23 6 0.43 56 5 0.36 
24 5 0.36 58 28 2.02 
25 5 0.36 59 23 1.66 
26 5 0.36 60 13 0.94 
27 12 0.87 61 14 1.01 
28 171 12.33 62 2 0.14 
29 2 0.14 63 22 1.59 
30 12 0.87 64 10 0.72 
31 2 0.14 65 13 0.94 
32 3 0.22 67 32 2.31 
33 8 0.58 70 7 0.5 
34 11 0.79 72 2 0.14 
35 111 8.00 73 161 11.61 
36 102 7.35 75 3 0.22 
37 17 1.23 76 1 0.07 
38 109 7.86 78 6 0.43 
39 21 1.51 79 26 1.87 
40 7 0.50 80 49 3.53 
41 1 0.07 82 5 0.36 
44 6 0.43 83 4 0.29 
   87 27 1.95 
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Panel F:  Three-Digit SIC Code Breakdown for Top 5 SIC Code Groups with 








Frequency for all 
Non-Public 
Offerings 
283 (Drugs) 101 52 153 
    
737 (Computer Programming, Data  72 49 121 
Processing)    
384 (Surgical, Medical, And Dental  43 33 76 
Instruments And Apparatus)    
357 (Computer And Office Equipment) 25 41 66 
    
131 (Crude Petroleum And Natural Gas) 23 27 50 
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Table 3 
Comparison of the Domestic Private Placement and Offshore Offerings 
 
 













Median p-value b 
Assets ($ millions) 876.827 577.368 0.466 29.516 18.997 0.000** 
Market Capitalization ($ millions) 320.743 355.096 0.662 60.512 32.527 0.000** 







Offerings p-value a 
Fraction of Officers on the Board of Directors 0.350 0.403 0.000** 
Fraction of Common Shares held by Directors and Officers 0.229 0.201 0.005** 
Fraction of Common Shares held by Institutional Investors 0.169 0.125 0.001** 
Fraction with Registration Rights 0.136 0.155 0.288 
** 5% level;  * 10% level. 
 
a The p-value is the value of a two-sided t-test of the difference in mean values between the private placement and 
offshore offering samples. 
 





Panel B: Comparison of the Domestic Private Placement and Offshore Offering Issuer’s Private 
Fraud Action Experience 
Variable 
No. of Private  
Placements 
Fraction of Total 
Private  
Placements 
No. of Offshore  
Offerings 
Fraction of Total 
Offshore  
Offerings 
Presence of a Pre-Offering Fraud Action 81 0.108 86 0.125 
 
p-value of difference in means is 0.301 (statistically insignificant).  The p-value is the value of a two-sided t-test of 
the difference in mean values between the private placement and offshore offering samples. 
 
   
  
   57
Panel C: Comparison of the Domestic Private Placement and Offshore Offering Issuer’s Private 








Offerings p-value a 
Offer Amount 1st Quartile 0.106 0.043 0.063* 
Offer Amount 2nd Quartile 0.067 0.076 0.802 
Offer Amount 3rd Quartile 0.101 0.279 0.000** 
Offer Amount 4th Quartile 0.164 0.261 0.050** 
** 5% level;  * 10% level. 
 
Offer Amount 1st Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount is less than 1.5 million dollars.   
 
Offer Amount 2nd Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount is greater than or equal to 1.5 
million dollars and less than 5 million dollars.   
 
Offer Amount 3rd Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount is greater than or equal to 5 mil-
lion dollars and less than 17.5 million dollars.   
 
Offer Amount 4th Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount is greater than 17.5 million dol-
lars.  The four quartiles are based on the distribution of offering amounts for the entire sample of offshore offerings 





Panel D: Comparison of the Domestic Private Placement and Offshore Offering Issuer’s Private 







Offerings p-value a 
Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 1st Quartile 0.128 0.078 0.191 
Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 2nd Quartile 0.103 0.128 0.533 
Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 3rd Quartile 0.098 0.220 0.006** 
Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 4th Quartile 0.127 0.162 0.418 
** 5% level;  * 10% level. 
 
Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 1st Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount to market 
capitalization ratio is less than 0.050.   
 
Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 2nd Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount to market 
capitalization ratio is greater than or equal to 0.050 and less than 0.112.   
 
Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 3rd Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount to market 
capitalization ratio is greater than or equal to 0.112 and less than 0.223.   
 
Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 4th Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount to market 
capitalization ratio is greater than 0.223.  The four quartiles are based on the distribution of offering amount to mar-
ket capitalization ratios for the entire sample of offshore offerings and domestic private placements. 
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Offerings p-value a 
SIC 35 (Ind. and Comm. Machinery and Computer Equip.) 0.060 0.094 0.014** 
SIC 36 (Electrical Equip. and Components) 0.049 0.093 0.001** 
SIC 73 (Business Services) 0.121 0.101 0.229 
SIC 357 (Computer and Office Equipment) 0.033 0.058 0.021** 
** 5% level;  * 10% level. 
 
a The p-value is the value of a two-sided t-test of the difference in mean values between the private placement and 





Panel F: Comparison of Private Fraud Class Actions from Bohn and Choi (1996) Study for the 







Offerings p-value a 
Number of Private Fraud Class Actions from Bohn and Choi 
(1996) for the Issuer’s 2-Digit SIC Group 
3.772 4.614 0.0167** 
Incidence of Private Fraud Class Actions from Bohn and Choi 
(1996) for the Issuer’s 2-Digit SIC Group 
0.028 0.031 0.0171** 
** 5% level;  * 10% level. 
 
Bohn and Choi (1996) report on the incidence of private securities fraud class actions arising out of an initial public 
offering for firms that went public from 1975 to 1986. 
 
a The p-value is the value of a two-sided t-test of the difference in mean values between the private placement and 
offshore offering samples. 
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Table 4 
Comparison of Private Placement and Offshore Offerings  
(For the Sub-Sample Involving a Pre-Offering Fraud Issuer) 
 





Offering p-value a 
Fraction with SEC investigation experience 0.358 0.163 0.0037** 
Fraction that resulted in settlement 0.862 0.727 0.0582* 
Fraction with dismissal or pro-defendant judgment 0.123 0.258 0.0507* 
Fraction consisting of a Class Action 0.952 0.912 0.3623 
Mean Resolution Time (in years) 2.280 2.063 0.3054 
Mean Settlement Amount ($millions) 5.545 5.470 0.9575 
** 5% level;  * 10% level. 
 
 





Offering p-value a 
Fraction with a new CEO two years after filing of suit 0.484 0.452 0.7152 
Mean CEO age at filing of suit 52.0 49.8 0.2456 
Mean change in fraction of officers on the board of directors -0.065 -0.013 0.0945* 
** 5% level;  * 10% level. 
 
 





Offering p-value a 
Fraction with Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach 0.316 0.413 0.3639 
Fraction with Top 5 Plaintiffs’ attorney as a Lead Attorney 0.474 0.630 0.1543 
Fraction with Top 5 Defense Attorney as a Lead Attorney 0.062 0.081 0.6253 
** 5% level;  * 10% level. 
 
Top 5 Plaintiff’s and Defense attorney firm rankings obtained from Forbes Magazine listing of the market leaders in 
class litigation from 1988 to mid-1995 (ranked by number of cases).  See Nancy Rutter, Bill Lerach Thinks of Him-
self as Robin Hood In a Class-Action Suit , Forbes, Oct. 9, 1995, at 116.  The Top 5 plaintiffs’ attorney firms listed 
in the Forbes article are:  Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach (193 cases), Berger & Montague (87 cases), 
Abbey & Ellis (73 cases), Wolf, Popper, Ross, Wolf & Jones (59 cases), and Barrack, Rodos & Bacine (57 cases).  
The Top 5 defense attorney firms are: Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati (50 cases), Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom  (45 cases), Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (29 cases), Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe (22 cases), 
and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (16 cases). 
 
a The p-value is the value of a two-sided t-test of the difference in mean values between the private placement and 
offshore offering samples. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Top 5 Plaintiffs’ attorneys Firms Involved in the Sample’s  
Pre-Offering Fraud Actions 
 
 
Top 5 Plaintiffs’ attorney firm rankings obtained from Forbes Magazine listing of the market leaders in 
class litigation from 1988 to mid-1995 (ranked by number of cases).  The Top 5 plaintiffs’ attorney firms 
listed in the Forbes article are:  Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach (193 cases), Berger & Montague 
(87 cases), Abbey & Ellis (73 cases), Wolf, Popper, Ross, Wolf & Jones (59 cases), and Barrack, Rodos & 
Bacine (57 cases).  See Nancy Rutter, Bill Lerach Thinks of Himself as Robin Hood In a Class-Action Suit, 
Forbes, Oct. 9, 1995, at 116.   
 















(where lead atty 
known) 
Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach                 12 31.5% 19 41.3% 
Berger & Montague                                        1 2.6% 6 13.0% 
Abbey & Ellis                                            2 5.3% 8 17.4% 
Wolf, Popper, Ross, Wolf & Jones                         1 2.6% 6 13.0% 
Barrack, Rodos & Bacine                                  5 13.1% 6 13.0% 
Total 18 47.4% 29 63.0% 
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Table 6 
Logit Model of the Decision to Conduct an Offshore Offering 
 
The dependent variable in all six maximum likelihood logit models treats companies that engaged in an offshore offering as 1 and 
companies that conducted solely a private placement within the United States as 0.    
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Log of Market Capitalization 0.126* 0.027 0.124 0.123 0.126* 0.195** 
 (1.658) (0.301) (1.626) (1.605) (1.643) (2.424) 
Log of Offering Amount -0.354** -0.618** -0.354** -0.362** -0.353** -0.300** 
 (-4.781) (-6.686) (-4.783) (-4.887) (-4.764) (-3.883) 
Number of Shareholders 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.143) (0.364) (0.179) (0.235) (0.118) (-0.008) 
Fraction of Shares held by Institutional 0.806* -1.652** 0.818* 0.816* 0.807* 0.910* 
Investors (1.744) (-2.195) (1.770) (1.748) (1.746) (1.919) 
World Contacts -0.004 0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.419) (0.306) (-0.440) (-0.255) (-0.422) (-0.324) 
Fraction of Board Comprised of Officers 1.942** 1.888** 1.940** 1.962** 1.944** 2.166** 
 (3.827) (3.057) (3.821) (3.850) (3.831) (4.086) 
Fraction of Common Stock held by -1.014** -1.018* -1.017** -0.971** -1.018** -0.856* 
Directors and Officers (-2.288) (-1.884) (-2.294) (-2.187) (-2.295) (-1.876) 
Dummy Variable for Common Stock -0.355** 0.032 -0.345** -0.363** -0.358** -0.359** 
Offering (-2.053) (0.155) (-1.991) (-2.095) (-2.068) (-2.026) 
Dummy for SIC 35 0.372 0.146 0.378 0.293 0.372 0.439 
 (1.220) (0.382) (1.239) (0.954) (1.219) (1.421) 
Dummy for SIC 36 1.004** 0.913** 1.005** 1.028** 1.003** 1.107** 
 (3.143) (2.443) (3.146) (3.201) (3.144) (3.400) 
Dummy for SIC 73 0.073 -0.318 0.082 0.057 0.078 0.049 
 (0.283) (-0.979) (0.318) (0.220) (0.302) (0.185) 
 
 
Table 6 Continues on Next Page 
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Table 6 Continued 
 
Dummy for Pre-Offering Fraud Action 0.677** 0.598* 0.607** 0.309 0.764* 0.627** 
 (2.458) (1.768) (2.111) (0.974) (1.809) (2.255) 
Pre-Offering Fraud x SEC Investigation -1.952** -2.922** -1.918** -2.293** -1.955** -1.763* 
 (-2.011) (-2.003) (-1.976) (-2.290) (-2.014) (-1.806) 
Dummy for SEC Investigation 0.657 0.862 0.659 0.681 0.655 0.517 
 (0.872) (0.940) (0.875) (0.899) (0.869) (0.683) 
Pre-Offering Fraud x Dismissal . . 0.612 . . . 
or Judgment for Defendants   (0.802)    
Pre-Offering Fraud x Top 5 . . . 1.102** . . 
Plaintiffs’ Attorney    (2.159)   
Pre-Offering Fraud x Post-PSLRA  . . . . -0.133 . 
Reform     (-0.273)  
Standard Deviation of Past 1-Year Returns . . . . . 10.609** 
      (3.143) 
Constant -0.416 -0.071 -0.414 -0.409 -0.413 -1.542** 
 (-1.144) (-0.166) (-1.136) (-1.122) (-1.132) (-3.097) 
Number of Observations 711 592 711 711 711 689 
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.211 0.081 0.085 0.080 0.091 
Log Likelihood -452.789 -318.634 -452.452 -450.314 -452.752 -433.265 
Likelihood Ratio Test a  
 
÷2(3) = 8.57** 
prob.=0.0356 
÷2(3) = 6.65* 
prob.=0.0839 
÷2(4) = 9.24* 
prob.=0.0553 
÷2(4) = 13.52** 
prob.=0.0090 
÷2(4) = 8.64* 
prob.=0.0706 
÷2(3) = 7.27* 
prob.=0.0637 
** 5% level;  * 10% level. (z-statistic in parenthesis). 
 
a The likelihood ratio test compares the fitted logit model against the same logit model without the Pre-Offering Fraud and SEC Investigation 
dummy variables and any interaction terms with these variables. 
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Table 7 
Change in the Probability of an Offering Securities Offshore Due to Fraud-Related Factors 
 
 
Change in probabilities are calculated using the logit model reported in Model 1 of Table 6.  
Two sets of changes in probabilities are calculated:  first using the mean values for all non-
fraud-related independent variables; second using the median values for all non-fraud-related 
independent variables.  All mean and median values are for the 711 observations used in Model 
1 of Table 6. 
 
Fraud-Related Dummy Variable Values 
Change to Probability 
Using  Mean Values 
Change to Probability 
Using Median Values 
Pre-Offering Fraud = 0  and SEC Investigation = 0 Base Base 
Pre-Offering Fraud = 1  and SEC Investigation = 0 +0.162 +0.168 
Pre-Offering Fraud = 1  and SEC Investigation = 1 –0.151 –0.137 
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Table 8 
Logit Model of the Decision to Conduct an Offshore Offering 
 
The dependent variable in all four maximum likelihood logit models treats companies that engaged in an offshore 
offering as 1 and companies that conducted solely a private placement within the United States as 0.   Offer Amount 
1st Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount is less than 1.5 million dollars.  Offer Amount 
2nd Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount is greater than or equal to 1.5 million dollars and 
less than 5 million dollars.  Offer Amount 3rd Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount is 
greater than or equal to 5 million dollars and less than 17.5 million dollars.  Offer Amount 4th Quartile is defined to 
include offerings where the offer amount is greater than 17.5 million dollars.  Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 
1st Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount to market capitalization ratio is less than 0.050.  
Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 2nd Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount to market 
capitalization ratio is greater than or equal to 0.050 and less than 0.112.  Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 3rd 
Quartile is defined to include offerings where the offer amount to market capitalization ratio is greater than or equal 
to 0.112 and less than 0.223.  Offer Amount/Market Capitalization 4th Quartile is defined to include offerings where 
the offer amount to market capitalization ratio is greater than 0.223. 
 
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Log of Market Capitalization 0.112 0.120 0.149* 0.155* 
 (1.469) (1.559) (1.884) (1.948) 
Log of Offering Amount -0.398** -0.403** -0.383** -0.383** 
 (-5.205) (-5.233) (-4.928) (-4.911) 
Number of Shareholders 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.173) (0.046) (0.257) (0.160) 
Fraction of Shares held by Institutional 0.883* 0.886* 0.819* 0.808* 
Investors (1.890) (1.874) (1.780) (1.742) 
World Contacts 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.125) (-0.091) (-0.164) (-0.375) 
Fraction of Board Comprised of Officers 1.925** 1.933** 1.908** 1.915** 
 (3.761) (3.760) (3.745) (3.747) 
Fraction of Common Stock held by -0.996** -0.958** -1.048** -1.017** 
Directors and Officers (-2.244) (-2.150) (-2.370) (-2.295) 
Dummy Variable for Common Stock -0.321* -0.326* -0.351** -0.359** 
Offering (-1.855) (-1.876) (-2.041) (-2.072) 
SIC 35 (Ind. and Comm. Machinery and 0.437 0.388 0.455 0.406 
Computer Equip.) (1.436) (1.261) (1.500) (1.331) 
SIC 36 (Electrical Equip. and Components) 0.994** 0.982** 0.989** 0.982** 
 (3.092) (3.040) (3.094) (3.064) 
SIC 73 (Business Services) 0.039 0.055 0.035 0.049 
 (0.150) (0.209) (0.135) (0.189) 
 
Table 8 Continues on Next Page 
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Table 8 Continued 
 
Pre-Offering Fraud x Offer Amount Quartile 1 -0.356 -0.087 . . 
 (-0.561) (-0.127)   
Pre-Offering Fraud x Offer Amount Quartile 2 -0.955 -0.812 . . 
 (-1.456) (-1.218)   
Pre-Offering Fraud x Offer Amount Quartile 3 0.375 0.628 . . 
 (0.987) (1.565)   
Pre-Offering Fraud x Offer Amount Quartile 4 1.270** 1.685** . . 
 (3.110) (3.679)   
Pre-Offering Fraud x Offer Amount to Market  . . -0.229 0.019 
Cap Ratio Quartile 1   (-0.429) (0.034) 
Pre-Offering Fraud x Offer Amount to Market  . . 0.349 0.605 
Cap Ratio Quartile 2   (0.751) (1.236) 
Pre-Offering Fraud x Offer Amount to Market  . . 0.666 0.986** 
Cap Ratio Quartile 3   (1.573) (2.132) 
Pre-Offering Fraud x Offer Amount to Market  . . 0.668 0.848* 
Cap Ratio Quartile 4   (1.465) (1.797) 
Pre-Offering Fraud x SEC Investigation . -2.238** . -1.969** 
  (-2.249)  (-2.015) 
Dummy Variable for SEC Investigation  0.691 . 0.668 
  (0.907)  (0.884) 
Constant -0.344 -0.367 -0.452 -0.470 
 (-0.941) (-0.999) (-1.236) (-1.281) 
Number of Observations 711 711 711 711 
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.092 0.076 0.082 
Log Likelihood -450.305 -446.668 -454.554 -451.772 
Likelihood Ratio Test a 
÷2(4) = 13.54** 
prob.=0.0089 
÷2(6) = 20.81** 
prob.=0.0020 
÷2(4) = 5.04 
prob.=0.2831 
÷2(6) = 10.60 
prob.=0.1014 
** 5% level;  * 10% level. (z-statistic in parenthesis). 
 
a The likelihood ratio test compares the fitted logit model against the same logit model without the Pre-Offering 
Fraud and SEC Investigation dummy variables and any interaction terms with these variables. 
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Table 9 
Post-Offering Litigation Experience of the Private Placement and Offshore Offering Issuers 
 
 
Panel A: Post-Offering Private Securities Fraud Litigation 
 
Table entries correspond to the fraction of offerings with post-offering private securi-
ties fraud litigation experience.  For each offering, the issuer’s post-offering private se-
curities fraud litigation experience for a period of up to three years after the offering is 
determined through examination of SEC filings on WESTLAW and LEXIS as well as 
press releases on PR-NEWSWIRE.   
 
 Pre-Offering Fraud Action 
Not Present 
Pre-Offering Fraud Action 
Present 
Private Placement 0.113 0.086 
Offshore Offering 0.108 0.221 
 
The p-value of a two-sided t-test of the difference in mean values between the private 
placement with pre-offering fraud action experience and the offshore offering with 
pre-offering fraud action experience samples is equal to 0.0164 (significant at the 5% 
level). 
 
The p-value of a two-sided t-test of the difference in mean values between the off-
shore offering without pre-offering fraud action experience and the offshore offering 
with pre-offering fraud action experience samples is equal to 0.0029 (significant at the 
1% level). 
 
The p-value of a two-sided t-test of the difference in mean values between the private 
placement without pre-offering fraud action experience and the offshore offering with 
pre-offering fraud action experience samples is equal to 0.0046 (significant at the 1% 
level). 
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Panel B: Post-Offering SEC Investigation Experience 
 
Table entries correspond to the fraction of offerings with post-offering SEC investiga-
tion experience.  For each offering, the issuer’s post-offering SEC investigation for a 
period of up to three years after the offering is determined through examination of 
SEC filings on WESTLAW and LEXIS as well as press releases on PR-NEWSWIRE.  
SEC investigations include formal and informal SEC investigations as well as SEC 
enforcement actions. 
 
 Pre-Offering Fraud Action 
Not Present 
Pre-Offering Fraud Action 
Present 
Private Placement 0.023 0.025 
Offshore Offering 0.042 0.035 
 
The p-value of a two-sided t-test of the difference in mean values between the private 
placement with pre-offering fraud action experience and the offshore offering with 
pre-offering fraud action experience samples is equal to 0.7014. 
 
The p-value of a two-sided t-test of the difference in mean values between the off-
shore offering without pre-offering fraud action experience and the offshore offering 
with pre-offering fraud action experience samples is equal to 0.7666. 
 
The p-value of a two-sided t-test of the difference in mean values between the private 
placement without pre-offering fraud action experience and the offshore offering with 
pre-offering fraud action experience samples is equal to 0.4749. 
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Table 10 
Discounts for Common Stock Offerings as a Fraction of the  
Secondary Market Price Measured at the Offering Date 
 
Panel A: Comparison of the Discounts for Common Stock Domestic Private Placements and 
Offshore Offerings   
 
The offering discount is defined as (the U.S. secondary market price at the start date of the offering mi-
nus the offering price) divided by the U.S. secondary market price at the start date of the offering.  A 
more positive offering discount therefore corresponds with a greater discount. 
Type of Offering 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median 25% Quartile 75% Quartile 
Domestic Private Placement 190 0.174 0.165 0.064 0.290 
Offshore Offerings 232 0.294 0.272 0.128 0.445 
The p-value from a two-sided unpaired t-test of the difference in mean values between the private placement 




Panel B: Comparison of the Actual Discount and Predicted Offshore Discount for  
Domestic Private Placement Common Stock Offerings   
 
The Predicted Offshore Discount is obtained through a two-step process.  First the below model for the 
offshore discount is estimated using only offshore offerings in the data sample (Adj R2 = 0.1369; 191 
observations). 
 
DISCOUNT = á + â1LNMKTCAP + â2LNOMKT + â3SHLDERS + â4BINSIDER + â5MDHOLD + 
â6MDHOLD^2 + â7TOBINQ+ â8YEAR_DUMMIES + â9SIC_DUMMIES + å 
 
Second, predicted offshore discounts are obtained for the domestic private placements using the esti-
mated model. 
 
The paired comparison is between the actual and predicted offshore discounts for domestic private 
placements where data on both discounts exists for each domestic private placement. 
Type of Offering 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median 25% Quartile 75% Quartile 
Domestic Private Placement 190 0.174 0.165 0.064 0.290 
Predicted Offshore Discount 232 0.237 0.221 0.116 0.333 
Domestic Private Placement 
(paired) 
153 0.154 0.164 0.037 0.273 
Predicted Offshore Discount 
(paired) 
153 0.224 0.219 0.114 0.312 
 The p-value from a two-sided unpaired t-test of the difference in mean values between the actual dis-
count and predicted offshore discount for domestic private placements of common stock is equal to 
0.0029 (significant at the 1% level). 
 
The p-value from a two-sided paired t-test of the difference in mean values between the actual discount 
and predicted offshore discount for domestic private placements of common stock is equal to 0.0021 
(significant at the 1% level). 
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Table 11 
Predicted Offshore Discount for Domestic Private Placement Common Stock Offerings 
(by Geographical Region Where Known) 
 
 
Panel A: Comparison of the Common Stock Offering Discount for the Offshore Offer-




Observations Mean Median 25% Quartile 75% Quartile 
Europe 53      0.186       0.143       0.049       0.275  
Canada 9      0.136       0.111  0.000      0.220  
Asia 11      0.266       0.373       0.200       0.511  
Latin America 17      0.307       0.345       0.242       0.375  




Panel B: Comparison of Actual Discount and Predicted Offshore Discount for Different 
Offshore Regions 
 
The Predicted Offshore Discount is obtained through a two-step process.  First the below model for the 
offshore discount is estimated using only offshore offerings in the data sample (Adj R2 = 0.1400; 191 
observations). 
 
DISCOUNT = á + â1LNMKTCAP + â2LNOMKT + â3SHLDERS + â4BINSIDER + â5MDHOLD + 
â6MDHOLD^2 + â7TOBINQ + â8YEAR_DUMMIES + â9SIC_DUMMIES + â10REGION_DUMMIES  + å 
 
Second, predicted offshore discounts are obtained for the domestic private placements using the esti-
mated model.  For each geographic region, the appropriate dummy variable is set equal to 1.  For exam-
ple, to obtain the predicted discount for offerings into Europe, the EUROPE dummy variable is set to 1 











count Means p-value 
Europe 0.198      0.187  0.025  0.2245 
Canada 0.135 0.123 -0.039 0.0559* 
Asia 0.194 0.183 0.020 0.3232 
Latin America 0.244 0.233 0.071 0.0006** 
Other 0.266 0.255 0.092 0.0000** 
The p-value from a two-sided unpaired t-test of the difference in mean values between the actual discount 
and the predicted offshore discount for private placement offerings. 
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Table 12 
Comparison of the Actual Discount and Predicted Offshore Discount for Domestic Pri-
vate Placement Common Stock Offerings (Categorized by PREFRAUD x SEC) 
 
 
The Predicted Offshore Discount is obtained through a two-step process.  First the below model for the 
offshore discount is estimated using only offshore offerings in the data sample (Adj R2 = 0.1256; 191 
observations). 
 
DISCOUNT = á + â1LNMKTCAP + â2LNOMKT + â3SHLDERS + â4BINSIDER + â5MDHOLD + 
â6MDHOLD^2 + â7PREFRAUD + â8PREFRAUD x SEC + â9SEC + â10TOBINQ+ 
â11YEAR_DUMMIES + â12SIC_DUMMIES + å 
 
Second, predicted offshore discounts are obtained for the domestic private placements using the esti-
mated model.  Both the actual discount and predicted offshore discounts are categorized by where (A) the 
interaction term PREFRAUD x SEC is equal to 0 (denoted as “low-risk”) and (B) where the interaction 
term is equal to 1 (denoted as “high-risk”). 
 
Type of Offering 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median 25% Quartile 75% Quartile 
(A) Domestic Private Placement 180 0.174 0.164 0.058 0.302 
(B) Domestic Private Placement 10 0.171 0.172 0.153 0.215 
(A) Predicted Offshore Discount 145 0.224 0.216 0.113 0.313 
(B) Predicted Offshore Discount  8 0.383 0.389 0.236 0.508 
The p-value from a two-sided t-test of the difference in actual discount mean values between categories 
(A) and (B)  is equal to 0.9741. 
 
The p-value from a two-sided t-test of the difference in the predicted offshore discount mean values be-
tween categories (A) and (B)  is equal to 0.0064 (significant at the 1% level).  
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Figure 3: Distribution of Offerings by Asset Size
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